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Interstate Child Custody and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act: The





Child custody determinations have traditionally been a matter of
state jurisdiction. Prior to the 1970s, custody decrees rendered by a
court in one state were not uniformly accorded full faith and credit
enforcement by the courts of other states. In practice, custody decrees
entered in one jurisdiction were often freely modified in other juris-
dictions.1 As a result, a divorced parent unhappy with a custody deci-
sion from one state could often obtain a rehearing simply by moving
to another state. On occasion, divorce lawyers even counselled their
clients to move to get a more favorable decree.2
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1968 and approved by the American Bar Association
later that year.3 The UCCJA was intended to alleviate the plight of
* J.D. 1994; B.A. 1975, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Ted Wob-
ber for his support and encouragement during the preparation of this Note. The author
would also like to thank Professor D. Kelly Weisberg for her comments on an early draft of
this Note and the Hastings Law Journal production and editorial staff for their editorial
comments during the final revision of the Note.
1. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., CASES AND PROBLEMS IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS 736-37
(1965) [hereinafter CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS] (noting that while states could not di-
rectly modify custody orders of other states, they could and did enter orders making differ-
ent provisions for the child).
2. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legis-
lative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1216
n.40 (1969) [hereinafter Bodenheimer, UCCJA] (citing letter from William Clemmons to
Committee on State Legislation, Council of State Governments (July 30, 1957)).
3. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1207 n.1.
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children caught in interstate custody battles by promulgating uniform
rules for the assertion of jurisdiction over child custody cases.4 By
1984 a version of the UCCJA had been adopted in all fifty states.
5
Although the intent of the UCCJA was to create uniformity in
the handling of interstate custody disputes, its effectiveness was di-
luted by the relatively slow adoption of the UCCJA by the states and
by differing state interpretations of the Act.6 To bolster the UCCJA
and to enhance uniformity in the resolution of interstate jurisdictional
disputes involving child custody,7 Congress passed the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act (PKPA) in 1980.8 Although the criteria for
jurisdiction under the PKPA are substantially the same as those estab-
lished by the UCCJA, the PKPA contains an explicit preference for
jurisdiction in the home state of the child. To aid enforcement and
promote finality of child custody decisions, the PKPA also provides
that child custody decrees rendered by a court that had validly exer-
cised jurisdiction are entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in
other states.9 Part I of this Note reviews the history of the UCCJA
and the PKPA.
Although the PKPA has been a qualified success, it has not com-
pletely resolved the issue of competing child custody decrees. States
differ in their interpretations of the PKPA's jurisdictional rules, as
they differed in interpreting the UCCJA's rules.10 Some of these in-
terpretational differences may result from attempts by courts to cor-
rect the PKPA's implicit bias against interstate moves. Occasionally,
4. Id. at 1216-17 (noting that the need for uniform legislation to correct the law ap-
peared to be evident and urgent). The Prefatory Note to the UCCJA states: "To remedy
this intolerable state of affairs where self-help and the rule of 'seize-and-run' prevail rather
than the orderly processes of the law, uniform legislation has been urged in recent years to
bring about a fair measure of interstate stability in custody awards." UCCJA prefatory
note, 9 U.L.A. 115, 117 (1988).
5. JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 669 (3d ed. 1992). Tech-
nically, Massachusetts is not a UCCJA state, but it has adopted a similar statute that deals
with the problem. Id. For a list of individual state statutory citations, see UCCJA tbl., 9
U.L.A. at 115-16 (Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
6. Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 324-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (reviewing the his-
tory of the UCCJA). See also Ann T. Wilson, Comment, The Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act: Is There An Enforcement Role for the Federal Courts?, 62 WASH. L. REv 841, 843
n.21 (1987) (stating that at the time the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) was
enacted in 1980, only 43 states had adopted some form of the UCCJA).
7. Barndt, 580 A.2d at 325 (reviewing the history of the PKPA).
8. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569
(1980) (codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a).
10. Federal courts have not been available to resolve the issue of competing state
decrees since the 1988 Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174
(1988), which held that the PKPA does not provide an implied cause of action in federal
courts to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid. See infra
notes 229-244 and accompanying text.
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interpretational differences between states are sharp enough to lead a
court in one state to set aside an apparently valid decree rendered by
another state and to make its own ruling, resulting in two presump-
tively valid child custody decrees rendered by different states. Part II
of this Note discusses the problems caused by varying interpretations
of the UCCJA and the PKPA and the effects on parents when these
problems result in competing custody decrees from different states.
Both the UCCJA and the PKPA were intended to remedy the
practice by courts of freely modifying custody decrees rendered in
other states. Both statutes provide that the decree-issuing state re-
tains continuing jurisdiction to modify its child custody decrees until it
relinquishes jurisdiction." However, the passage of the PKPA has not
completely eliminated confusion about the extent of a court's power
to modify the custody decree of another state. As a result, de facto
concurrent jurisdiction over the modification of child custody decrees
still exists. The uniform national standard for resolving interstate
child custody disputes envisioned by the drafters of the PKPA has not
yet been achieved. Part III of this Note considers the special
problems of jurisdiction over the modification of child custody
decrees.
Finally, Part IV of this Note reviews several alternatives for
resolving the problems of interstate custody disputes while still main-
taining the single-forum focus of the PKPA. This Note rejects federal
jurisdiction as a method of ensuring uniform interpretation of the
PKPA because federal jurisdiction is nonpractical. Statutory indeter-
minacies could be corrected by amendments to the PKPA and the
UCCJA. However, this Note proposes that the best way to establish a
uniform national standard is for individual state legislatures to ex-
pressly adopt child-based jurisdiction.
I. Historical Perspective
A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
Traditionally, child custody determinations have been handled
exclusively by state courts. Since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, federal courts have routinely declined diversity jurisdiction over
domestic relations disputes.12 The Supreme Court has observed that
"[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
11. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. at 292; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
12. For a brief discussion of the so-called "domestic relations exception" to diversity
jurisdiction and a recent United States Supreme Court case concerning this issue, see infra
notes 251-262 and accompanying text.
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parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States."13
Prior to the adoption of the UCCJA, the domestic relations laws
of individual states typically allowed a state to assert jurisdiction over
child custody if it had a "substantial interest" in the case. 14 A state
could claim a "substantial interest" either if it had been the dominant
domicile of the married couple, or if it was the current residence of
the child or either parent.15 Under this vague standard, it was often
possible for two or more states to assert jurisdiction concurrently.
The confusion over jurisdiction was compounded by judges' will-
ingness to relitigate the custody decisions of other states. As a result,
custody decrees were often freely modified in other states.16 Prior to
the adoption of the UCCJA and the passage of the PKPA, state court
decisions demonstrated a history of inconsistent law and an often un-
predictable and arbitrary approach to determining the "best interests
of the child."'1 7 In many cases, the court's sympathy was swayed more
by the ongoing battle between the parents than by the needs of their
children.'
The uncertain enforceability of child custody decrees was further
complicated by inconsistent Supreme Court decisions, which did not
clarify whether custody decrees were entitled to the protection of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.' 9 According to the prevailing view at
13. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
14. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 320-21 (1968) [hereinafter CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS].
15. Id. at 321.
16. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 737.
17. The phrase "best interests of the child" is often misused by courts. As Homer
Clark has pointed out, the "best interests of the child" standard should not be taken too
literally:
The child's interests are not the only consideration to be taken into account ....
[Tlhe parents' interests must be regarded ...[and] ...must be given some
weight, not merely because they are related to the child's welfare, but because we
recognize that a parent's interest in the training, upbringing and companionship
of his child has an independent importance in our society which must be
respected.
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 788-89
(2d ed. 1988).
18. Jane Moran, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: An Analysis of its His-
tory, A Prediction of its Future, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 135, 137-38 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 607-08 (1958) (indicating that if forum
jurisdiction bases modification of custody decree on changed circumstances, rendering ju-
risdiction's decree not entitled to full faith and credit); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-
34 (1953) (holding that in a habeas corpus proceeding, the forum jurisdiction is not bound
to give a custody decree full faith and credit where the rendering jurisdiction had no per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parent); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947) (holding
that since custody decrees are subject to modification in the rendering jurisdiction under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, they are subject to modification in the forum jurisdic-
[Vol. 45
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the time, child custody decisions were always modifiable based on a
sufficiently substantial change in circumstances. Since custody deci-
sions were not considered "final," they were not entitled to full faith
and credit enforcement. The Court believed that the best interests of
the child overrode the interests of national unity underlying the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.20 As a result, lower courts in different juris-
dictions were willing to grant rehearings to divorced parents unhappy
with custody decisions from other courts, and divorce lawyers some-
times counselled their clients to move to other states to obtain rehear-
ings.21 The ease with which parents could reopen child custody cases
in other states was aptly described by Justice Jackson as "a rule of
seize-and-run."22
A survey conducted in the 1960s by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws convinced the Commissioners
that "the rule of 'seize and run' [was] indeed rampant throughout the
country;" that "many courts freely alter[ed] custody decisions made
out-of-state; that conflicting custody decrees in two states [were] no
rarity; and that innumerable children [were] without secure and per-
manent homes because of severe shortcomings in interstate custody
law."23 In 1968, the National Conference drafted the UCCJA to re-
duce jurisdictional competition and confusion and to deter parents
tion). See also Leonard G. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MiCH. L. REv.
795, 798-807 (1964) (summarizing and discussing these opinions).
20. May, 345 U.S. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
21. See Bodenheimer, UCCIA, supra note 2, at 1216.
22. May, 345 U.S. at 542 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Some years earlier Justice Rutledge
also criticized the Court's refusal to apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause to child custody
decisions: "The result seems unfortunate in that, apparently, it may make possible a con-
tinuing round of litigation over custody, perhaps also of abduction, between alienated par-
ents. That consequence hardly can be thought conducive to the child's welfare." Halvey,
330 U.S. at 619-20 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
23. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1216-17.
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from crossing state lines to relitigate custody.24 A version of the
UCCJA has now been adopted in every state.25
In an attempt to restrict jurisdictional proliferation, the UCCJA
provides only four bases for a state to assert jurisdiction over child
custody matters: (1) if the state is the home state of the child; (2) if
the state has a "significant connection" with the child and one of his or
her parents; (3) if the child is physically present in the state and either
has been abandoned or is threatened with child abuse (usually re-
ferred to as "emergency jurisdiction"); or (4) if it appears that no
other state has jurisdiction under one of the other three prerequisites,
or such other state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, and it is in the
"best interests of the child" that the state assert jurisdiction.26 The
UCCJA stresses interstate communication and cooperation. It en-
courages states to set up procedures mandating that judges hearing
child custody cases contact other interested forums and jointly deter-
mine which state will decide the substantive issues.27 Interstate com-
munication is critical since only one state at a time can validly exercise
jurisdiction under the UCCJA.28 The UCCJA also provides that a
court may not modify an existing custody decree unless the issuing
court has relinquished jurisdiction.29
Although no specific preference was given to any one of the juris-
dictional bases, many state courts interpreting the UCCJA have held
that, in situations where more than one state might validly exercise
jurisdiction, courts should defer to the home state of the child as the
24. The aims of the UCCJA were to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in mat-
ters of child custody... ;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states ...
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in
the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal
relationships is most readily available... ;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody...
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to ob-
tain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states ...
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts ... ; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. at 123-24.
25. Id. at 115-16.
26. Id. § 3, at 143-44.
27. Id. § 6, at 219-20, § 7, at 233 & cmt. at 234.
28. Id. § 6, at 219-20.
29. Id. § 14, at 292.
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state with the strongest contacts.30 This "maximum contacts" ap-
proach was supported by the official comment to the UCCJA.31
Adoption of the UCCJA did not completely eliminate the prac-
tice of concurrent jurisdiction,32 in part because of the statutory inde-
terminacies of the UCCJA itself. Despite the UCCJA's endorsement
of "maximum contacts" jurisdiction, the observation in the comment
that "significant contacts" jurisdiction might be asserted by a state
with "equal or greater" ties with the child 33 opens the door for judicial
discretion. Some judges interpreted the UCCJA to require only an
inquiry into whether the court might assert jurisdiction consistently
with the UCCJA, not a determination of which state was best situated
to decide custody. 34
B. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
Although the UCCJA was at least partially successful in achiev-
ing greater uniformity among states in resolving interstate child cus-
tody disputes, states were initially slow to accept the Act. In the late
1970s Congress considered several proposals to deter parents from
taking their children across state lines to avoid enforcement of cus-
tody decrees. These proposals included making parental kidnapping a
federal crime, according full faith and credit by statute to child cus-
tody decrees, and amending the diversity jurisdiction statute to give
30. See, e.g., Nistico v. District Court, 791 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Colo. 1990) (stating that
the UCCIA vests jurisdiction in the child's home state, if there is one); Kemp v. Sharp, 409
S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. 1991) (stating that proper jurisdiction under the UCCJA is in the
home state of the child); Hattoum v. Hattoum, 441 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(holding that the UCCJA treats home state jurisdiction as preferable). Not all states follow
this approach. See, e.g., Cullen v. Prescott, 394 S.E.2d 722, 725 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("The
UCCIA does not call for a balancing of the child's contacts with competing states with
jurisdiction going to the state with the greater volume of evidence or contacts.") (citing
Meier v. Davignon, 734 P.2d 807, 810 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)).
31. The purpose of the jurisdiction section of the UCCJA is "to limit jurisdiction
rather than to proliferate it .... The interest of the child is served when the forum has
optimum access to relevant evidence about the child and family. There must be maximum
rather than minimum contact with the state." Id. § 3 cmt. at 145. Significant contacts juris-
diction is appropriate only "if there is no home state or the child and his family have equal
or stronger ties with another state." Id. at 144.
32. Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act,
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845, 914 (1992).
33. UCCJA § 3 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 144-45.
34. See, e.g., Yon v. Fleming, 595 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that the child had contacts with both New York and Florida so either forum would have
something to support it under the UCCIA); Fazio v. Fazio, 587 So. 2d 91, 96 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that although Louisiana arguably was the "home state" of child, Florida
also had jurisdiction under UCCIA because of significant contacts of family with Florida).
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federal courts the power to enforce valid state custody decrees. 35 The
full faith and credit approach eventually won majority support, and in
1980 Congress enacted the PKPA.
36
Despite its title, the PKPA was not limited to criminal matters
relating to parental kidnapping.37 A major purpose of the PKPA was
to ensure that a state would enforce the decrees validly made under
the UCCJA, whether or not the state had itself adopted the UCCJA.
38
The PKPA also attempted to rectify one of the statutory weaknesses
of the UCCJA by creating an explicit preference for jurisdiction in the
home state of the child.39 Under the PKPA, a state cannot assert "sig-
nificant contacts" jurisdiction unless there is no state that meets the
"home state" requirement.40 The PKPA reiterates the UCCJA's di-
rective that only one state at a time can validly exercise jurisdiction
over a custody determination. 41
35. See, e.g., H.R. 325, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposal to amend the diversity
statute); H.R. 988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposal to accord full faith and credit to
child custody decrees); H.R. 762, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposal to make parental
kidnapping a crime). For an extended discussion of the legislative proposals of the late
1970s that ultimately resulted in the PKPA, see Goldstein, supra note 32, at 915-22.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The PKPA also provides for the use of the Federal Parent
Locator Service in connection with the enforcement or determination of child custody de-
crees and in cases of parental kidnapping of a child. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 11(c), 94
Stat. 3568, 3571-73 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 note; 42 U.S.C. §§ 654 (17),
655(a)(1), 663, 1305 (1988)).
37. Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The stated purposes of
the PKPA are very similar to those of the UCCJA. The PKPA is to:
(1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a determination of
custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can best decide the case in
the interest of the child;
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between States which are concerned with the same child;
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees ...
(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody...
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts in matters
of child custody and visitation ... ; and
(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of children.
Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
38. At the time the PKPA was enacted, only 43 states had adopted some form of the
UCCJA. Wilson, supra note 6, at 843 n.21.
39. The PKPA's jurisdictional language was tightened in response to complaints made
at the congressional hearings preceding the passage of the PKPA about overly broad inter-
pretations of the UCCJA's jurisdictional requirements. Russell M. Coombs, Interstate
Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711, 778
(1982) [hereinafter Coombs, Child Custody].
40. A state may not assert "significant contacts" jurisdiction unless "it appears that no
other state would have [home state] jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
41. The PKPA states:
A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of an-
[Vol. 45
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The most important innovation of the PKPA is the statute's ex-
press application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to child custody
decrees. The PKPA provides that a custody decree issued by a state
that has asserted jurisdiction in compliance with PKPA provisions is
entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in other states.42 The leg-
islative enactment, entitled "Full faith and credit given to child cus-
tody determinations," is placed directly after the statutory codification
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.43
The PKPA applies directly to the enforcement of decisions al-
ready rendered. It was designed to guide a state court faced with an
other State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consist-
ently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination.
Id. at § 1738A(g).
42. "The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided .... any child custody determination made con-
sistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." Id. at § 1738A(a).
43. "The PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, is an addendum to the full faith and credit stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This fact alone is strong proof that the [PKPA] is intended to have
the same operative effect as the full faith and credit statute." Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 183 (1988).
Shortly after the PKPA was passed, several commentators raised questions about the
statute's constitutionality because "the establishment of national child custody jurisdic-
tional standards is a regulation of traditionally state-supervised activities." Marian C.
Abram, Note, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Constitutionality and Effectiveness,
33 CASE W. Rus. L. REv. 89, 106 (1982) (noting the constitutional difficulties in states that
decide to repeal the UCCJA). One source of constitutional authority for the statute is the
Commerce Clause. Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause have historically been
broadly interpreted. Id. at 98-99 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)). The widespread prob-
lem of interstate parental abductions, because of, in part, a lack of uniformity among
states' jurisdictional rules, is arguably a substantial impairment of interstate commerce. Id.
at 106-07.
Although the Supreme Court has never been called upon to rule directly on the con-
stitutionality of either the UCCIA or the PKPA, it has suggested that "status adjudication
rules" such as the UCCJA are not unfair. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,208 n.30 (1977)
("We do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as
the particularized rules governing adjudications of states, are inconsistent with the stan-
dards of fairness."). But see Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territo-
riality, 52 OHIo ST. L.. 369, 381-82 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court's comment is
misplaced, since child custody determinations, unlike divorce decrees, are not adjudica-
tions of status). The Court has construed statutory provisions of the PKPA several times
without questioning its constitutionality. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
187 (1988) (holding that the PKPA does not provide a federal cause of action, without
addressing the Act's constitutionality); California v. Superior Court (Smolin), 482 U.S. 400,
412 (1987) (stating that the PKPA creates uniform federal rules to which states must ad-
here, without addressing the Act's constitutionality).
There apparently has been no direct challenge to the constitutionality of the PKPA in
a federal court. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 933 n.405. However, the Washington Supreme
Court has rejected a claim that the PKPA is unconstitutionally void in its application. State
v. Carver, 781 P.2d 1308, 1313-14 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
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attack on the validity of a custody determination made by another
state or with a request for the modification of such a decree.44 As
many courts have realized, however, the statute also indirectly gov-
erns initial custody determinations. If a custody decree fails to con-
form to the requirements of the PKPA, it will not be entitled to full
faith and credit enforcement in another state.45
II. Jurisdictional Issues Under the PKPA
A. The PKPA-A Qualified Success?
The PKPA was intended to reduce jurisdictional competition in
interstate custody disputes. But how successful has it been? The
existence of a federal statute setting forth jurisdictional standards
makes it more difficult for a state to disregard or overturn a sister
state's decree.46 Some commentators maintain that comparatively few
cases in which state courts have refused to recognize out-of-state cus-
tody decrees have been reported since the passage of the PKPA in
1980.47 Other commentators believe that such optimism in the success
of the PKPA is misplaced and that courts continue to assert jurisdic-
tion when they think it is appropriate, crafting a judicial argument to
ignore or evade the PKPA.48
Many interstate child custody determinations are made without
explicitly relying on the PKPA. Courts following the "maximum con-
tacts" approach to UCCJA jurisdiction use the home state of the
child, if there is one, as the presumptive forum for child custody deter-
minations.49 Since this approach to the UCCJA yields the same result
as would use of the PKPA, courts may not be relying on the PKPA
simply because the additional authority of the federal statute is not
required.
One difficulty in evaluating the success of the PKPA is that its
effectiveness would best be measured by the cases not brought-cus-
tody decisions that are not challenged in another state because the
"losing" parent believes such relitigation would be futile. However,
44. Davidson v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
45. Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992).
46. Atwood, supra note 43, at 369 n.4.
47. See, e.g., Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody
Jurisdiction Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REv. 885, 912 (1993) (noting that the PKPA is working
well and the number of courts entering orders inconsistent with the PKPA is decreasing).
48. Atwood, supra note 43, at 371 n.14; Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L. J. 291, 362-64 (1986); Goldstein, supra note 32, at
928-29.
49. See, e.g., Atkins, 823 S.W. at 819 (stating that PKPA mandates exclusive jurisdic-
tion in home state of child); Rogers v. Platt, 245 Cal. Rptr. 532, 538 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that "significant contact" jurisdiction under PKPA only considered when child has no
home state).
[Vol. 45
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empirical data measuring the number of cases not brought because of
the PKPA is lacking.50
The PKPA's success can be inferred from the courts' use of the
statute to resolve jurisdictional disputes. Courts have used the PKPA
to terminate custody proceedings when they learned of proceedings
pending in other states.51 Courts have also voluntarily stayed their
own proceedings because of proceedings in another state that ap-
peared to have jurisdiction under the PKPA. 52 Under the authority of
the PKPA, courts have refused to enjoin enforcement of adoption de-
crees of other states and have reversed or vacated custody decisions of
lower courts of their own state because another state had proper juris-
diction under the PKPA.53 The PKPA has been used to strike down a
state jurisdictional statute on the ground that it was "clearly contrary"
to the intent of the federal law.54 At least one court has raised the
PKPA on its own motion to resolve a dispute the litigants claimed was
controlled by the UCCJA.55
The PKPA has also made judges issuing child custody decisions
more aware of the need to communicate with judges in other inter-
ested forums.5 6 Some states have even instituted formal procedures
50. Blakesley, supra note 48, at 362.
51. Hunter v. Hunter, 585 So. 2d 71,72 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (reporting that Virginia
court dismissed custody proceeding upon learning of Alabama proceeding).
52. Stowers v. Humphrey, 576 So. 2d 138 (Miss. 1991) (affirming trial court's stay of
proceedings pending decision in another state).
53. See, e.g., Swan v. Swan, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (Nev. 1990) (reversing trial court's de-
nial of motion to vacate decree entered without jurisdiction); Capobianco v. Willis, 567
N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 1991) (upholding dismissal of proceeding to modify out-of-
state decree); State ex rel. D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing trial
court's modification of out-of-state decree for lack of jurisdiction); Shute v. Shute, 607
A.2d 890 (Vt. 1992) (upholding trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction to another
state); Wyoming ex rel. Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1992) (finding
that trial court lacks jurisdiction where other state has not relinquished jurisdiction).
54. Archambault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Mass. 1990).
55. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Mich. 1993) (holding that since the
PKPA requires enforcement of the sister-state decree, no detailed analysis of the UCCJA
is required).
56. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 585 So. 2d 71, 72 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (courts con-
ferred); Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (Indiana
and New Jersey judges conferred on jurisdiction); Holm v. Smilowitz, 615 N.E.2d 1047,
1052 n.6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (correspondence between Utah and Ohio courts resolved
jurisdictional conflict); In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. 1992) (Texas court acknowl-
edged the cooperation of Minnesota court in resolving jurisdictional dispute); Griffin, 831
P.2d at 236 (Wyoming judge cooperated with Virginia judge). But see Yost v. Johnson, 591
A.2d 178, 182 (Del. 1991) (trial judge's communication with a judge in another state in
attempt to resolve a custody jurisdiction dispute without informing either parent violated
due process rights of litigants).
Judicial conferences sometimes fail to resolve disputes. See, e.g., Glanzner v. State
Dep't of Social Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (telephone conference
with Missouri judge did not prevent California judge from exercising jurisdiction).
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requiring judges to communicate in writing with judges in other inter-
ested states.57 Although the data is not completely clear, it appears
that the PKPA has been at least a qualified success.
B. Federal Preemption
Where the PKPA conflicts with a state child custody statute either
on its face or with its application, many courts have held that the
PKPA controls because of federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause.58 However, technically, the PKPA cannot preempt the
UCCJA because the UCCJA covers many areas that the PKPA does
not address.59 Therefore, the statutory reach of the PKPA and the
UCCJA are not coextensive, and the question of federal preemption
has not been completely settled by courts.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that the
PKPA does not preempt the UCCJA and other relevant state law con-
cerning child custody.60 Since the subject of domestic relations was
traditionally the exclusive province of state law, the court reasoned
that any federal statute concerning a domestic relations issue could
not be presumed to preempt state law unless Congress had expressly
authorized preemption.
61
57. "Reliance solely upon oral communications between judges can cause confusion.
The better rule of practice and the one we adopt today is that, without written notification
that the sister-state court yields jurisdiction ... Oklahoma must defer .... In re C.A.D.,
839 P.2d 165, 175 (Okla. 1992).
58. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Bressett, 602 So. 2d 433, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (in case of
conflict between the PKPA and the UCCJA, PKPA prevails); Adoption of Zachariah K., 8
Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 429 (Ct. App. 1992) (PKPA preempts state law on issue of state's juris-
diction to render valid custody decree); Capobianco v. Willis, 567 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App.
Div. 1991) (PKPA preempts UCCJA under Supremacy Clause); Shute v. Shute, 607 A.2d
890, 893 (Vt. 1992) (PKPA preempts conflicting state statutes); Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837
P.2d 25, 45 (Wyo. 1992) (PKPA establishes policy of federal preemption in the area of
custody jurisdiction) (citing Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675, 679-80 (W. Va. 1984)).
The federal preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the Con-
stitution, and holds that any state law must yield if it interferes with or is contrary to fed-
eral law. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
59. Blakesley, supra note 48, at 331. For example, the UCCJA has specific notice re-
quirements, UCCJA §§ 4-5, 9 U.L.A. at 208, 212-13; discusses standards for a finding that a
court that otherwise has jurisdiction is an inconvenient forum, id. § 7, at 233-34; and pro-
vides procedures for the filing and enforcement of a custody decree in a new state, id. § 15,
at 311, while the PKPA is silent on these issues. See also Templeton v. Witham, 595 F.
Supp. 770, 772 (S.D. Cal. 1984) ("[Tihe PKPA does not present a case of clear-cut federal
preemption, since it expressly incorporates state law.").
60. Archambault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Mass. 1990) (finding lack of
congressional intent for preemption).
61. Id. Having made the point that Massachusetts retained the authority to legislate
in the child custody area, the court went on to strike down a state statute regulating juris-
diction in child abuse cases. The state law was invalidated on the ground that it was con-
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An Ohio appellate court avoided the federal preemption issue by
construing the PKPA narrowly. In Holm v. Smilowitz, 62 the children
and their mother had moved to Utah, and their father had moved to
North Carolina.63 The Ohio court assumed jurisdiction over the child
custody dispute based on Ohio's status as the original decree-issuing
state.64 The court's assertion of jurisdiction was arguably in conflict
with the PKPA, which provides that continuing jurisdiction remains
with the decree-issuing state only if the children or at least one of the
custodial contestants continue to reside in that state.65 However,
holding that the PKPA did not apply, the Ohio court noted, "There
being no clear indication that Congress intended the [PKPA] to divest
a state court of jurisdiction outside the context of a jurisdictional con-
flict or full faith and credit problem, we decline to hold that Ohio law
has been preempted in this instance.
' '66
Occasionally a court will ignore the PKPA entirely and substitute
its own judgment for the jurisdictional priorities established by the
federal statute. For example, despite the PKPA's clear preference for
jurisdiction in the home state of the child, some courts in states other
than a child's home state have asserted priority jurisdiction under the
traditional "best interests" standard.67 Although the "best interests of
the child" remain an overriding concern, the purpose of both the
PKPA and the UCCJA was to substitute an orderly definition of "best
trary to the intent of Congress, as embodied in the PKPA, to promote mutual assistance
between the states in child custody matters. Id. at 207.
62. 615 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
63. Id. at 1051.
64. Id. at 1052.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
66. Holm, 615 N.E.2d at 1056. The Ohio court may have been motivated to find a
way around the PKPA because it feared that otherwise the litigants might be denied a
forum entirely. The court explained, "[T]he court below acted properly to assume jurisdic-
tion and protect the minor child from being relegated to a jurisdictional vacuum where no
court would have been present to enforce visitation or, perhaps more importantly, child
support obligations." Id. at 1055 n.10. Utah had already declined jurisdiction, apparently
on the ground that the mother had moved to Utah to deprive the father of his visitation
rights. Id. at 1052. The court may have decided it was better to assert jurisdiction, at least
temporarily, than to risk additional delays by declining jurisdiction. "Unquestionably, the
Utah or North Carolina courts will eventually exert control over this case and, at that time,
the court below should be petitioned to relinquish jurisdiction." Id. at 1055 n.10. The
court may also have been motivated by a desire to punish the mother by denying her the
convenience of the Utah courts. "It would be ignoble of this court to construe the PKPA
or UCCIA in such a manner so as to sanction the very activities which Congress... sought
to prevent." Id. at 1056.
67. "[C]ourts in this state may assume jurisdiction of a custody dispute upon a finding
that it is in the best interest of the child to do so." Cullen v. Prescott, 394 S.E.2d 722, 725
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990). See also Lee v. Meeks, 592 So. 2d 282,286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming that the controlling consideration in a habeas corpus proceeding involving child
custody is the best interests of the child).
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interests" for free-wheeling judicial discretion.68 The PKPA presumes
that a child's best interests are generally met by having the decisions
about her custody rendered in her home state.
C. Statutory Interpretation Problems of the PKPA
Courts applying the PKPA are not always in agreement on the
statute's meaning. There are a number of frequently recurring statu-
tory interpretation problems involving the PKPA, including how the
home state of the child is defined and determined and when a court
outside of the home state can exercise jurisdiction. In addition, the
statute provides no easy way to resolve the problem of competing
state decrees. 69
(1) What is the "Home State"?
The PKPA defines "home state" as "the State in which, immedi-
ately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive
months." 70 This definition is virtually identical to the one used in the
UCCJA. 71
According to Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer, a drafter of the
UCCJA and an influential witness at congressional hearings on the
PKPA,72 the "home state" definition was based on the "established
home" concept of Professor Leonard Ratner.73 Professor Ratner de-
fined "established home" as the last place a child lived with a parent
for a sufficient time to become integrated into the community. 74 The
drafters of the UCCJA believed that the court in the "established
68. The Supreme Court may have unwittingly added to the confusion by observing
that under the PKPA, "jurisdiction can turn on the child's 'best interest."' Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 186 n.4 (1988) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2)(B)-(D)). How-
ever, the PKPA itself provides that "significant contacts" jurisdiction may not be asserted
unless there is no "home state," as defined by the statute, and that jurisdiction premised
solely on the best interests of the child may only be asserted if it appears that no other state
would exercise jurisdiction under one of the other sections. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c)(2)(B),
(D). See also discussion of the meaning of the term "best interests of the child," supra
note 17.
69. The following discussion is intended to point out certain frequently recurring stat-
utory interpretation problems of the PKPA. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list of
these problems. For an extensive discussion of the statutory interpretation problems of
both the UCCJA and the PKPA, see Goldstein, supra note 32, at 875-933.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)(4).
71. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 914.
72. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
73. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1224.
74. Ratner, supra note 19, at 815. Professor Ratner recognized that the "established
home" criterion would not cover all factual situations. Some children, for example, will
have moved so frequently that they have no established home. Id. at 818-19. Professor
Bodenheimer cited the possibility that no home could be established for purposes of the
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home" of the child would usually have the most access to information
concerning the child and would therefore be able to make the best
decision for the child.75
Use of the established home concept avoided some of the disad-
vantages of using a child's domicile or legal residence as the home
state. 76 Since "domicile" is a technical term related to the parents'
legal residences, a child's domicile might be located in a state in which
the child is not actually living or where the child has never been.
77
Despite the unusually clear legislative history of the PKPA, some
courts have disregarded the state in which the child is currently living
and persisted in defining "home state" as the state that rendered the
initial decree,78 or the state of domicile of the custodial parent.79 Not
only does this interpretation contradict the legislative history, it also
sometimes leads to results that defy common sense. The intention of
the home state concept was to base jurisdiction, whenever possible, in
the place where a child was currently living. Using a definition of
"home state" related to a parent's residence or domicile subverts the
intention of the PKPA to ensure that the state that renders a custody
decision is the one with the best current access to information con-
cerning the child.
(2) Home State in Joint Custody Situations
The PKPA and its legislative history provide little guidance for
how home state is defined in joint custody situations. It is fairly well
settled that an extended period of visitation with one parent does not
affect the home state.8 0 In the case of visitation, the custodial parent
UCCJA as the principal reason for the inclusion of "significant contacts" jurisdiction.
Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1225.
75. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1221.
76. Id. at 1224.
77. Id. at 1224 n.62.
78. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Michalik, 476 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that the PKPA reserves modification to state of initial decree); Marquiss v. Mar-
quiss, 837 P.2d 25, 44 (Wyo. 1992) ("The home state jurisdiction ... continues to exist until
the [sister-state] court no longer has jurisdiction . .. or . .. decides to exercise
jurisdiction.")
79. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Greenfield, 599 So. 2d 1029, 1030-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (finding that the mother's legal residence remained in Florida, despite her actual
residence in Illinois for more than six months, because she maintained her voter's registra-
tion, driver's license, and motor vehicle registration in Florida, retained ownership of a
parcel of land in Florida, left part of her furniture and appliances in Florida, and had
secured reemployment in Florida; therefore, Florida's assertion of home state jurisdiction
under the PKPA was appropriate).
80. See., e.g, Yost v. Johnson, 591 A.2d 178, 183 n.3 (Del. 1991) (children's extended
visitation with father in Delaware did not make Delaware their home state); In re Interest
of J.T., 485 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (summer visitation did not establish resi-
dence in state for jurisdictional purposes).
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retains sole legal responsibility for long-term decisions affecting the
children's future. However, in a joint custody award, both parents are
legally responsible for such decisions. 81 A child in a joint custody situ-
ation might have two established homes.
Neither the official Comment to the UCCJA nor the PKPA's
statement of congressional "Findings and Purposes" refers to joint
custody.8 2 Perhaps the failure of either statute to address joint cus-
tody is due to the fact that joint custody of children did not become
common until some years after the UCCJA and the PKPA were
enacted.
83
Some courts addressing this issue have held that either state can
exercise jurisdiction in the event of joint custody, even though the
child might not have physically resided in one of the states for six
consecutive months.84 The "significant contacts" approach has been
used as a tie breaker in some of these situations.85 This approach is
not satisfactory, however, because each court's assessment of "signifi-
cant" is subjective. Two courts might reach different conclusions as to
which was the state that had the most "significant contacts," thus cre-
ating the possibility of competing decrees. It was the unavoidable
subjectivity in the UCCJA's "significant contacts" jurisdiction that the
PKPA's explicit home state preference was designed to remedy.
In order to prevent ambiguity, the state in which the child spends
the majority of the year (for example, the entire school year) should
be designated as the "home state" for purposes of the PKPA. This
approach is logically consistent with the expressed preference of both
the UCCJA and the PKPA that child custody determinations be made
81. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 765 (1989).
82. UCCJA §§ 2 cmt., 3 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 134, 144-45; Congressional Findings and
Declarations of Purposes, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
83. Oregon was the first state to authorize joint custody in 1977. C. Rick Chamberlin,
Joint Custody: Its Legislative and Judicial Evolution, TRIAL, Apr. 1989, at 24. The UCCJA
was drafted in 1968; the PKPA became effective in 1980. UCCJA historical note, 9 U.L.A.
at 116; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
84. St. Andrie v. St. Andrie, 473 So. 2d 140, 144 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
since neither state was the "home state" and both met the "significant contacts" test, either
state could properly exercise jurisdiction; however, laws in both states required the state in
which the later filing was made to defer jurisdiction to the state in which the first filing was
made). The granting of joint legal custody to both parents following a divorce means that
both parents are jointly responsible for legal decisions affecting the child's future. Physical
custody is not necessarily evenly divided between the parents. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG,
supra note 81, at 765.
85. Kaye v. Kaye, No. FA87-02372105, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1021, at *6-*8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 1992) (finding jurisdiction under both the "home state" and
"significant contacts" test); Tabuchi v. Lingo, 588 So. 2d 795,798 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (hold-
ing that in joint custody situation, state that does not satisfy "home state" or "significant
contacts" test may not exercise jurisdiction).
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in the state that has the strongest contacts with a child.8 6 It also has
the advantage of being a clearly stated, easily applied rule that fur-
thers the statutory goal of reducing uncertainty in child custody litiga-
tion. In those relatively rare instances in which the child spends the
same amount of time with both parents and neither state has stronger
contacts, or in cases where the factual situation makes the "estab-
lished home" a close call, 87 courts in the two competing states should
confer to resolve the difficulty.
(3) What is the Meaning of "Proceeding"?
Closely related to the assertion of home state jurisdiction is the
definition of "proceeding." Both the UCCJA and the PKPA measure
the six-month statutory period for determination of the child's home
state from the commencement of the "proceeding." 88 Although the
term "proceeding" is not defined in the statute, many courts have in-
terpreted it to mean the most recent court action relating to custody,
such as the filing of a petition for modification. 89
Some courts, however, have held that "proceeding" refers to the
initial divorce/custody hearing only.90 Modification hearings are
treated as a continuation of the original action, not a new and separate
action. The statutory language does not support this static approach.
Congress intended that jurisdiction not be rooted to a state that
lacks current contacts with the child. The PKPA provides that a
86. UCCJA § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. at 143; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A). See supra notes
31, 40 and accompanying text.
87. In Kaye, the custody decree had awarded joint legal custody to both parents, with
"primary residence of the child" awarded to the mother. No. FA87-02372105, 1992 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1021, at *3. The mother subsequently moved to Pennsylvania with her new
husband, but her son remained with his father in Connecticut during the summer, creating
uncertainty over when the six-month statutory period should begin. Id. at *3-*4.
88. UCCJA § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. at 143; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) ("state ... is the
home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or... had
been the child's home state within six months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding").
89. Umina v. Malbica, 538 N.E.2d 53,57 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989), supports this position
and provides a list of precedents, including Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481, 485 (Colo. 1986)
(holding "proceeding" to mean pending motion affecting custody); Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440
A.2d 894, 898 (Conn. 1981) (interpreting "proceeding" to refer to modification action, not
original dissolution action); State ex rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tenn.
1985) (interpreting "proceeding" to refer to instant modification action); In re Custody of
Thorensen, 730 P.2d 1380, 1384 n.6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "proceeding" re-
fers to action that results in order that sister-state court is being asked to enforce).
90. Andrews v. Andrews, No. FA92-300136-S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 40, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1993) (holding that determination of "home state" is made at time
of commencement of original proceedings); In re Marriage of Michalik, 476 N.W.2d 586,
592 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting "proceeding" to be the action that resulted in origi-
nal custody decree). See also Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 44 (Wyo. 1992) (defining
"home state" as state that rendered initial decree).
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court's continuing jurisdiction to modify a prior decision continues
only as long as the state remains the residence of the child or of either
parent.91 Treating modification hearings as a continuation of the ini-
tial "proceeding" implies that jurisdiction would lodge perpetually in
the state where the initial custody order had been made, even if both
parents had left the state. This result is not in harmony with the intent
of the PKPA.
92
(4) What is a "Removal or Retention"?
The PKPA provides that the "home state" of the child does not
change if a child's absence from the state is the result of the child's
"removal or retention" by a parent in another state.93 This provision
is intended to deter abductions by not allowing a parent to profit from
moving to another state in order to relitigate custody.94 A parent who
left the state following a divorce without the other parent's knowledge
or consent and who attempted to conceal his or her whereabouts from
the other parent would have to return to the decree-rendering state
for any attempt to modify custody.95
Although the "removal or retention" provision is intended to de-
ter abductions, the definition of "abduction" is not completely clear.
The classic "abduction" occurs when a parent, unhappy with a custody
determination, moves the child secretly to another state in an effort to
avoid enforcement. 96 However, the language of the PKPA makes it
difficult to draw distinctions between parents who abduct their chil-
dren and those who take their children to another state for legitimate
reasons, such as remarriage or new employment. The PKPA also has
a deterrent effect on child-snatching motivated less by a desire to ob-
tain a court order than by a wish simply to be with the child.97 Some
courts have denied jurisdiction to a parent who has moved to a new
state, even when there has been no attempt to conceal the wherea-
bouts of the child.98
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
92. Umina, 538 N.E.2d at 57.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
94. One of the stated legislative purposes of the PKPA is to "deter interstate abduc-
tions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation
awards." Findings and Purposes of PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568, 3569 (1980).
95. Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Cal. 1982).
96. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Minn. 1991) (following custody
award of daughter to father, mother took daughter to distant state and successfully evaded
authorities for seven years).
97. Russell M. Coombs, The "Snatched" Child is Halfway Home in Congress, 11 FAM.
L.Q. 407, 412 (1978) [hereinafter Coombs, Snatched Child]. Mr. Coombs was Deputy
Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time the PKPA was enacted.
98. The California Supreme Court has held that there is an "implied prohibition" in a
divorce decree not to remove children to a "remote location which would frustrate visita-
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The UCCJA and the PKPA were designed to address the prob-
lem of post-custody decision removals.99 In theory, either parent has
equal rights to the children before a divorce action has been insti-
tuted.100 In practice, the retention or removal provisions of the PKPA
have been applied to pre-divorce removals as well. Professor
Bodenheimer, a drafter of the UCCJA whose published views on the
Act were and are widely considered authoritative,' 0' may have unwit-
tingly increased the confusion by stating that the UCCJA should be
used to prohibit pre-decree child snatching. 0 2
Sometimes, prior to a divorce, a parent will take children to an-
other state to intentionally deny. the other parent access to the chil-
dren, thereby influencing custody negotiations. 0 3 In other cases, a
parent's move to another state might be generated by legitimate or
understandable concerns. A non-working mother, for example, might
want to return to her parent's home in order to decide what to do
about a troubled marriage.'0 4 A woman in such a situation might not
be completely honest about her intentions when she leaves a state. 0 5
However, in the absence of concealment or an attempt to deny access
to the children, is it fair to treat such a parent as an abductor?
A parent might also take a child in fleeing domestic violence or to
protect the child from sexual or physical abuse by the other parent.
Many courts have been unsympathetic to parents fleeing domestic
abuse and have refused to relinquish jurisdiction to the asylum
state.106 Only recently has the issue of domestic violence received
tion." Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1005 n.3 (Cal. 1982). Many, but not all,
custody decisions require that a custodial parent notify the court before moving to another
state. Some states require that the court approve the parent's move. For an excellent
overview of the constitutional problems raised by such restrictions on parental relocations,
see Mandy S. Cohen, A Toss of the Dice: The Gamble with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws,
18 HoFSTRA L. REv. 127 (1989).
99. See UCCIA prefatory note, supra note 4.
100. "Absent a court order to the contrary, both parents have equal rights to the cus-
tody of their child." Washington v. Carver, 781 P.2d 1308, 1318 n.6 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
101. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 914.
102. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203,226-27 (1981) [hereinafter Bodenheimer,
Interstate Custody]. Professor Bodenheimer wanted to deny jurisdiction to a mother who
had "run off" with her children to her parent's home in another state. Id. at 212.
103. See., e.g., In re Custody of Bhatti, 391 S.E.2d 201,203 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (father
took children from Georgia to North Carolina without mother's knowledge or consent and
refused to let mother know of children's whereabouts).
104. Davidson v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
105. The mother in Davidson, for example, went to Iowa to visit her mother following
the death of her father and then did not return to Wisconsin. Id.
106. See., e.g., In re Marriage of Nazar, 474 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding Louisiana could not assert jurisdiction over child custody when mother had "uni-
laterally removed children" there to escape from abusive husband in Minnesota); Dunne v.
Dunne, 560 N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding New York remained proper court to
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substantial public attention, which may be the reason why neither the
UCCJA nor the PKPA specifically addresses it.
Any attempt to determine the correct definition of "retention or
removal" in the PKPA is complicated by the "wrongful taking" provi-
sion of the UCCJA. Section 8 of the UCCJA allows a court to decline
to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of a "wrongful taking" or "other
reprehensible conduct" on the part of one of the litigants. 10 7 The
PKPA contains no such language. Since the UCCJA and the PKPA
are not coextensive, 108 it is not clear whether the PKPA supersedes or
supplements the UCCJA. Therefore, it is not clear whether the
UCCJA's "wrongful taking" language is still controlling.
10 9
It is significant that the UCCJA was drafted during an era when
fault-based divorce was still the norm. In fault-based systems, as the
name implies, custody decisions were often affected by the relative
fault of the parties for the failure of the marriage, as determined by
the court. One of the explicit aims of the UCCJA was to focus cus-
tody decisions on the best interests of the child and to end the prob-
lem of "punitive" decrees. 1 0 Yet, fault-based notions still seem
embedded in the UCCJA, particularly in Section 8's discussion of
"wrongful taking.""'
Because of its antecedents in the UCCJA, the PKPA retains the
earlier statute's bias against any removal of a child to another state.
Under the PKPA, a move judged to be a "removal or retention"
would bar jurisdiction in the new state. The better-reasoned view is to
treat all pre-divorce interstate moves, not accompanied by conceal-
ment or an attempt to deny access to the child, as presumptively legiti-
mate and not a "removal or retention." A parent who had concealed
adjudicate child custody even though mother had left state to escape domestic violence;
proper remedy for mother was to seek protective order from New York court).
Some courts have taken a more enlightened view. Van Norman v. Upperman, 436
N.W.2d 834, 835 (Neb. 1989) (holding custody jurisdiction in Kansas appropriate when the
mother had gone to Kansas with her children because she feared for her life and the health
of her children at the hands of her husband). For a good general discussion of this topic,
see Linda R. Keenan, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory
Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 (1985).
107. UCCJA § 8, 9 U.L.A. at 251.
108. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text discussing federal preemption.
109. Judgmental language is still used in many child custody decisions, indicating that
fault-based notions may still be influencing judicial decisions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Nazar, 474 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (mother had taken children out of state
under "false pretenses"); Davidson v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(Wisconsin court referred without comment to Iowa trial court's dismissal of mother's cus-
tody action; Iowa court called mother's Iowa filing, after she had moved back to parents
home in Iowa pending a divorce, a "fraud on the court").
110. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1238-42.
111. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of fault-based divorce notions on the
development of the UCCJA and the PKPA, see infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
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his or her location because of fear of domestic violence or child abuse
could rebut this presumption by showing adequate evidence of abuse.
(5) Emergency Jurisdiction
The PKPA provides that a court may assert jurisdiction based
solely on the physical presence of the child "if the child has been
abandoned, or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child be-
cause he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse." 1 2 However, the statute is silent as to what constitutes an
emergency. Some courts have defined emergency broadly, holding
that emergency jurisdiction is appropriate if a child is living in unsani-
tary living conditions." 3 Others have held that emergency jurisdiction
may be asserted only in very limited circumstances. For example, an
Indiana appellate court found no basis for emergency jurisdiction on
the ground of abandonment when a mother left her children with their
stepfather for three days without telling anyone where she had
gone.1 4 It has been held that an emergency can include the fact that a
mother used marijuana and alcohol,1 5 or allegations of child abuse in
connection with a custody dispute. 1 6 Some courts have held that
emergency jurisdiction does not exist at all under the PKPA, at least
with respect to modifying an existing decree." 7 Other courts have
taken an intermediate approach, holding that emergency jurisdiction
exists, but only to enter a temporary custody order." 8
Some commentators have complained that the limited emergency
jurisdiction provisions in the PKPA leave a court unable to provide a
forum in child abuse cases. 1 9 Some courts may feel a powerful urge
to act in cases of alleged child abuse and may even believe that a fail-
ure to act would be irresponsible. 20 This argument is unpersuasive.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(C).
113. Renno v. Evans, 580 So. 2d 945, 950 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
114. Cox v. Cox, 536 N.E.2d 521, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
115. Swan v. Swan, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (Nev. 1990).
116. State ex rel. Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233, 240 (Wyo. 1992). See also
Wierszewski v. Tokarick, 418 S.E.2d 557, 559 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding claims by chil-
dren that stepfather had mistreated them during visitation not sufficient to establish emer-
gency jurisdiction).
117. Stanley v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 567 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. Civ. App.
1990). There is no reference to emergency jurisdiction in the provisions of the PKPA deal-
ing with modification or custody decrees. Baron, supra note 47, at 910.
118. "Emergencies, by definition, do not last." Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24,28 (Miss.
1990). See also State ex. rel D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating as-
sumption of emergency jurisdiction is temporary and should last only as long as necessary
to contact the decree-issuing state).
119. Derek S. Nakamura, Emergency Jurisdiction to Modify Out of State Child Custody
Orders: Temporary Orders Under the Hawaii Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 20 HAw. BJ. 115 (1987).
120. Id. at 117.
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There is no reason for courts to believe that the courts of other states
should be less concerned with the welfare of children and the serious
problems of child abuse.' 2' Exercising emergency jurisdiction in such
cases may only delay a needed resolution.
(6) Jurisdiction by Consent?
Prior to the 1970s, many states had substantive custody rules that
favored one party or the other. Today there are almost no significant
differences in the substantive custody laws of the individual states.
States have enacted virtually uniform substantive child custody laws
based on the "best interests of the child.' 22
Procedural differences still remain. In some states, child custody
jurisdiction is considered analogous to in personam jurisdiction-a lit-
igant may waive the right to challenge a foreign state's jurisdiction by
voluntarily filing in that jurisdiction or by failing to challenge jurisdic-
tion at the earliest opportunity. One court following this approach
held that a mother, who resided with her children in Illinois, waived
her right to challenge the custody jurisdiction of Indiana after she vol-
untarily engaged the Indiana court to decide custody. 123 A Florida
court held that a Florida resident who signed a stipulation in which
she agreed to allow New York to resolve custody could not later chal-
lenge New York's assertion of jurisdiction. 124 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that parties may expressly establish jurisdic-
tion by mutual consent, but only if the court selected could validly
exercise jurisdiction under one of the bases enumerated in the
UCCJA. 125
121. Archambault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Mass. 1990)
122. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 856-57. Of course, since defining the "best interests
of the child" is left to judicial discretion, there may still be substantial differences in the
way similar fact situations are treated by different judges. However, this is a matter of
differences between individual judges, not of differences in state law.
123. Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 1990). See also Kean v. Kean, 577
So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (even though husband resides in New York, he chose
his forum when he filed suit in Louisiana); Murnane v. Murnane, 552 A.2d 194, 197 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (nonresident wife had waived right to challenge New Jersey's
custody jurisdiction when she filed a divorce action in New Jersey against a New Jersey
resident); Lutes v. Alexander, 421 S.E.2d 857, 863 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (when father at-
tempted to enforce foreign state judgment in Tennessee, he had purposely availed himself
of Tennessee law and could not later challenge Tennessee's personal jurisdiction over him).
Home state jurisdiction may not be waived merely because a parent appears in a related
child support action in another state. Otherwise, a noncustodial parent could force the
custodial parent to relitigate custody in the noncustodial parent's state simply by withhold-
ing child support payments. Kemp v. Sharp, 409 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. 1991).
124. Siegel v. Siegel, 548 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
125. Joliff v. Joliff, 829 P.2d 34, 36 (Okla. 1992) (citing Neger v. Neger, 459 A.2d 628,
638 (N.J. 1983)).
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Other states treat child custody jurisdiction as analogous to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived.126 Courts following
this approach will not accept "waivers" of the PKPA's jurisdictional
provisions 127 and will not honor a couple's agreement to litigate in a
particular state.' 28 Even after both parents have agreed to litigate in a
state, courts have voided child custody orders sua sponte for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 29
The differing views among state courts about whether custody ju-
risdiction can be waived by consent of the parties have led courts to
reach opposite results on similar facts. In In re Marriage of Schnei-
der, 30 an Indiana appellate court was faced with a challenge to Indi-
ana's jurisdiction to modify a child custody decree issued by
Wisconsin. The court denied the challenge, reasoning that since the
decree had already been modified once before in Indiana without ap-
peal by either party, the couple had tacitly agreed that Indiana was the
state with the most significant current contacts and therefore the ap-
propriate forum. 13' A Utah appellate court faced with similar facts
reached the opposite conclusion.' 32 It held that only the decree-issu-
ing state, Florida, had jurisdiction to modify its custody decree, even
though the mother and children had moved to Utah and the father
had voluntarily filed a custody modification action in Utah. 33
Challenges to jurisdiction are sometimes used as a delay tactic. A
parent may agree to jurisdiction in a particular forum, intending either
to accept a favorable decision or to challenge an unfavorable decision
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such attempts at procedural
manipulation have not gone unnoticed by the courts. In Schneider,
the Indiana court denied a mother's jurisdictional challenge because it
believed that the mother merely sought to delay a court-ordered
126. See., e.g., McDougald v. Jensen, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 860 (1986) (Washington had no jurisdiction to modify custody decree issued by
another state despite father's consent to Washington's jurisdiction); Swan v. Swan, 796 P.2d
221 (Nev. 1990) (Nevada court lacked jurisdiction where children had been taken to Ne-
vada by father less than ten days prior to issuance of order and evidence indicated the
children had closer ties to Utah); Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (all
petitions for modification of custody must be addressed by state that rendered the decree if
that state retained jurisdiction under UCCJA).
127. In re Marriage of Arnold & Cully, 271 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1990); Mosley
v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231,244 (Miss. 1985). Neither the UCCIA nor the PKPA provides
for jurisdiction established by the consent of the parties.
128. See, e.g., Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting In re Marriage
of Bueche, 550 N.E.2d 48, 51-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
129. Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34,39 (N.D. 1991) (holding court had no jurisdiction
because children and both parents had left state).
130. 555 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
131. Id. at 199.
132. Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
133. Id. at 125-26.
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change of visitation. 34 Similarly, a Florida court denied a mother's
jurisdictional challenge to an unfavorable decision because "to allow
[the mother] to proceed in Florida after litigating and losing the cus-
tody issue in New York would be contrary to the very purposes" of
the UCCJA and the PKPA.1
35
Despite the potential for procedural manipulation, courts that re-
ject custody jurisdiction established by consent of the parties seem to
defy both logic and common sense, particularly if the court allows a
challenge to upset a judgment already rendered. Although it is true
that neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA expressly addresses the issue
of jurisdiction by consent, the UCCJA does provide that notice re-
quirements may be waived if a party submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. 136 This is a strong argument that jurisdiction might be estab-
lished by consent as well. Professor Ratner, one of the drafters of the
UCCJA, noted that a forum selected by one parent and accepted by
the other without objection provides a venue convenient to both in
which a full adversary proceeding is likely to occur.' 37 Ratner ex-
plained, "Since such an adversary proceeding increases the availability
of the evidence and the probabilities of a correct decision, the same
values that underlie the established home principle support the juris-
diction of such a forum."'138
(7) The Special Problem of Child Support Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional decisions are further complicated because the re-
quirements for child support actions and child custody actions may
not be the same. A custodial parent may not file a child support ac-
tion in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over the parent owing
support. 39 However, the Comment to the UCCJA states,14° and the
overwhelming majority of states that have considered the issue
hold, 141 that personal jurisdiction over an absent parent is not re-
134. In re Marriage of Schneider, 555 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
135. Siegel v. Siegel, 548 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
136. UCCJA § 5(d), 9 U.L.A. at 213.
137. Ratner, supra note 19, at 819.
138. Id. However, Professor Bodenheimer rejected the theory of "consent-based" cus-
tody jurisdiction, which she believed would lead to forum-shopping. Brigitte
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining
Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modification, 65 CAL. L. REv.
978, 998-1000 (1977).
139. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The custodial parent can sue the
parent owing support in the absent parent's domicile state, using the procedures of the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). See infra note 215
and accompanying text.
140. UCCJA § 12 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 274-75.
141. In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 906-12 (Ct. App. 1980); Goldfarb v.
Goldfarb, 256 S.E.2d 648, 650-51 (Ga. 1980); In re Marriage of Bueche, 550 N.E.2d 48, 51
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quired to bring a child custody action. A court might have valid juris-
diction in a child custody matter but be unable to decide child support
issues because it lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the parents.
To avoid a bifurcation that would be burdensome to the litigants in
these situations, courts sometimes decline to exercise custody jurisdic-
tion.142 The existence of these differing standards is in itself a substan-
tial obstacle to the national uniform jurisdictional standards
envisioned by the UCCJA and the PKPA, since it is rare that a parent
will want to litigate custody issues without also considering the issue
of child support.
The United States Supreme Court may have unwittingly confused
the issue by its recent decision in Burnham v. Superior Court.143 In
dicta, Justice Scalia implied that personal jurisdiction over an absent
parent was necessary to decide child custody.144 Professor Atwood
has pointed out that Justice Scalia's approach, applying ordinary con-
cepts of personal jurisdiction to child custody, significantly undercuts
both the UCCJA and the PKPA.' 45 If this approach is followed, it
would leave the states with decidedly less power to render final and
enforceable custody decrees. 46 So far, courts considering child cus-
tody decisions have shown little inclination to follow the Burnham
dicta.
(8) Effects of Competing State Decrees
Differing state interpretations do not necessarily result in com-
peting decrees. Some states have a policy of deferring to a prior ren-
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 117-19 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); Warwick v. Gluck, 751 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1982); Martinez v. Reed, 490 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Genoe v. Genoe,
500 A.2d 3, 7-8 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Shingledecker v. Shingledecker, 407
S.E.2d 589, 591 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Hart v. Hart, 327 S.E.2d 631, 635 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985); Catlin v. Catlin, 494 N.W.2d 581, 589-591 (N.D. 1992) (citing numerous cases); Pratt
v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 1981); Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287, 293 (Wash. Ct
App. 1983); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 617 (W. Va. 1984); In re Marriage of
Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). See also Atwood, supra note 43, at
370-71; Helen Garfield, Due Process Rights of Absent Parents in Interstate Custody Con-
flicts, 16 IND. L. Rv. 445 (1983); Russell J. Weintraub, Affecting the Parent-Child Relation-
ship Without Jurisdiction over Both Parents, 36 Sw. LJ. 1167 (1983); Comment, Jurisdiction
over the Nonresident Parent in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, 34 BAYLOR L.
REv. 107 (1982). But see Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984) (requiring juris-
diction over absent parent to litigate custody); Hostetler v. Kennedy, 590 N.E.2d 793, 794-
95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (requiring jurisdiction over absent parent to litigate custody).
142. See, e.g., In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. 1992) (Minnesota declined to exer-
cise custody jurisdiction so that both custody and child support could be tried in Texas).
143. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
144. Id. at 623.
145. Atwood, supra note 43, at 372.
146. Id.
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dered decision.147 Courts holding this view implicitly assume that,
depending on the circumstances, any one of several states might val-
idly assert jurisdiction under the PKPA. Since only one court at a
time can validly assert such jurisdiction, a state should defer to the
state asserting jurisdiction "first in time" in conformity with the
PKPA.1
48
Other courts interpret the PKPA to mean that only the state with
the best significant contacts can validly assert jurisdiction.1 49 A court
holding this view may decide to set aside a prior custody decree ren-
dered in another state on the ground that the prior court was not the
one with exclusive jurisdiction under the PKPA. 150
Some courts have set aside other courts' custody decrees on more
dubious grounds, including "lack of due process" if notice was not re-
ceived by the out-of-state party, 151 or if notice was received but the
out-of-state parent was not present at the custody hearing.' 52 Other
courts, perhaps more sensitive to the possibility of procedural abuse,
have denied due process challenges if a parent participated actively in
the proceedings but deliberately failed to appear on the day the deci-
sion was rendered, 153 or if one parent concealed his or her wherea-
bouts in an effort to avoid service.' 54
The latter approach, denying challenges by parents who refused
to cooperate with custody proceedings or deliberately concealed their
whereabouts, is more consistent with the UCCJA, which does not re-
147. "[W]here . . . [a court] ... is presented with a child custody proceeding and is
informed that a court of another state already may have exercised jurisdiction, the proper
inquiry is not whether... [this court] ... could exercise jurisdiction, but whether the first-
in-time court's exercise of jurisdiction was in accordance with the UCCJA and the PKPA
.. " Zierenberg v. Zierenberg, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 1992).
148. In re C.A.D., 839 P.2d 165, 172 (Okla. 1992). Judge Alma Wilson vigorously dis-
sented, observing that "[t]he PKPA does not establish a procedural 'race to the court
house' test to determine jurisdiction between competing states." Id. at 177 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). But see Moore v. Moore, 463 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
Michigan court erroneously refused to exercise jurisdiction by not determining whether
Kentucky was properly exercising jurisdiction because an earlier custody proceeding had
been filed in Kentucky).
149. "Subsection (c)(2)(B)(i) of the PKPA eliminates the possibility of concurrent ju-
risdiction by conferring exclusive ... jurisdiction upon the home state of the child ... 
Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 37 (Wyo. 1992).
150. See, e.g., Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992) (setting aside prior
Louisiana custody decree because Arkansas as children's home state had exclusive jurisdic-
tion to render custody decision). See also Glanzner v. State Dep't of Social Servs., 835
S.W.2d 386, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (setting aside prior California custody order because
PKPA gave Missouri priority jurisdiction as children's home state).
151. State v. Carver, 781 P.2d 1306, 1314 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
152. Lee v. Meeks, 592 So. 2d 282, 289-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Zuhmer, J.,
concurring).
153. Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1084 (R.I. 1991).
154. Lutes v. Alexander, 421 S.E.2d 850, 863 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY AND THE PKPA
quire actual notice.155 Unlike foreign state default judgments in con-
tract or tort cases, a divorced parent cannot reasonably disclaim
knowledge that custody might be contested at some future time. Each
parent has an affirmative obligation to keep the other informed of his
or her current residence. One parent should not be able to deprive
the other parent of the ability to litigate custody simply by disappear-
ing. Unlike a tortfeasor's relationship with his or her victim, a par-
ent's relation with his or her children is deliberately forged and does
not disappear once the initial lawsuit is over.'
56
When two states have rendered facially valid decrees and neither
state has set aside the other's decree, an impasse may occur. In some
cases, a third state court may be available to resolve the issue. In
Giambrone v. Giambrone5 7 a Massachusetts appellate court had to
decide whether to enforce an Ohio order granting custody to the fa-
ther or a New York order granting custody to the mother. The Giam-
brones had filed for divorce in New York, but Mr. Giambrone had
subsequently moved to Ohio.'58 Although Mr. Giambrone attempted
to terminate his divorce action and refile it in Ohio, the New York
lower court refused to recognize the termination and awarded custody
to Mrs. Giambrone. 5 9 Meanwhile, an Ohio court awarded custody to
Mr. Giambrone. 60 When Mrs. Giambrone subsequently moved to
Massachusetts, she sought enforcement of the New York decree.' 61
The Massachusetts court upheld the New York custody order because
New York had been validly exercising jurisdiction at the time it ren-
dered its decision.' 62
The conflict in Giambrone was resolved by the fortuitous involve-
ment of a third court. However, most parents faced with conflicting
decrees are denied the option of a third state court to act as tie
breaker. The use of federal courts to resolve statutory interpretation
155. The notice requirement is satisfied if the manner of giving notice is reasonably
calculated to give actual notice. UCCJA § 5 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 213 (citing Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)).
156. Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane! A Cri-
tique of Recent Supreme Court Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient
Presence Jurisdiction Is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in
a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REv. 497, 570-71 (1991).
157. 586 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. ld. at 28. Mr. Giambrone did not succeed in terminating his New York divorce
action until 1988, when a New York appellate court affirmed Mr. Giambrone's right to




problems has been barred since the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in
Thompson v. Thompson.
163
Lacking access to either federal or state courts to resolve an im-
passe, a parent may resort to self-help. In State v. Carver,164 a father
who had what he believed was a valid California custody decree was
arrested for criminal custodial interference when he arrived in Wash-
ington to pick up the child.165 The Washington Supreme Court held
that the prior California custody decree was invalid because Mrs.
Carver had not received actual notice of the custody hearing.
166
Although the notice had been sent to Mrs. Carver's last known ad-
dress, Mrs. Carver did not receive it because she had moved without
informing Mr. Carver of her current address. 167 The court rejected
Mr. Carver's claims that the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA
were too complex for the person of average intelligence to interpret
and that the operation of the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 68
Here, differing interpretations of the PKPA had a dire effect. The
mother moved to another state with her child and concealed the
child's whereabouts, resulting in the father's unsuccessful attempt to
abduct the child. Ironically, these are the "seize-and-run" tactics the
PKPA, and the UCCJA before it, were designed to prevent.
69
163. 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that PKPA's legislative history is clear that Congress
did not intend the federal courts to play enforcement role). See infra notes 229-244 and
accompanying text.
164. 781 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
165. Id. at 1311.
166. Id. at 1317-18.
167. Id. at 1310. The Washington court also cited the assistance of the California pros-
ecutor in Washington's criminal prosecution of Mr. Carver as further evidence that Califor-
nia had relinquished jurisdiction. Id. at 1317. The court's argument is unconvincing. It is
dubious to assume that decisions made by a California prosecutor in connection with a
criminal matter have any connection to jurisdiction decisions made by a California judge in
a civil proceeding.
168. Id. at 1313. Mr. Carver's lament is one with which any student of the PKPA can
sympathize.
169. "In situations like this [involving conflicting custody decrees] the litigants do not
know which court to obey. They may face punishment for contempt of court and perhaps
criminal charges for child stealing in one state when complying with the decree of an-
other." UCCJA prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 117. Of course, it could be argued that neither
parent in Carver acted in good faith. The mother moved to Washington without resolving
pending dissolution proceedings in California. The father went to "pick up" his child in
Washington when he had reason to believe the mother would fight his attempt.
For case studies of other conflicting decrees, see Juliet A. Cox, Judicial Wandering
Through a Legislative Maze: Application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to Child Custody Determinations, 58 Mo. L.
REv. 427 (1993) (discussing Glanzner v. State Dep't of Social Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990)); James C. Murray, One Child's Odyssey Through the UCCJA and the
PKPA, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 589 (1993) (discussing In re A.E.H., 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1991),
cert. denied sub nom C.C. v. P.C., 112 S. Ct. 338 (1991)).
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It is difficult to determine how widespread such impasses are.
More serious conflict results from the continuing willingness of states
to modify other states' custody decrees.
I1. Special Problems of Modification Jurisdiction
A. Modification Jurisdiction Generally
In the pre-UCCJA era, the issue of jurisdiction to modify existing
child custody decrees was traditionally one of the most difficult to re-
solve. Child custody orders were modifiable in most states whenever
a substantial change of circumstances occurred. However, the state in
which the change of circumstances occurred was responsible for defin-
ing "substantial."'1 70 The UCCJA addressed the freely modifiable
character of custody decisions.171 As Professor Bodenheimer
explained:
Prior to the Uniform Act, the Courts of other states often assumed
concurrent jurisdiction to modify a custody decree if the child hap-
pened to be in their territory, without regard to the pre-existing and
continuing jurisdiction of the state of the original decree .... Con-
current jurisdiction in several states to modify an existing custody
judgment was a major source of parental resort to kidnapping to
gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum. The exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction frequently resulted in collisions between the
courts of different states which made contradictory custody
awards.172
The UCCJA and the PKPA attempted to resolve this problem by
granting continuing jurisdiction to modify a custody decree to the
state that rendered the decree. As long as the court retained jurisdic-
tion under the laws of its own state and the state remained the resi-
dence of the child or at least one parent, the state maintained
jurisdiction. 73 Most courts have construed the PKPA to mean that
the issuing state has exclusive jurisdiction to modify its own custody
decrees.' 74 Under this view, even an order domesticating a divorce in
170. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 737-38. Some states took the
position that only a change in circumstances occurring after the decree was rendered could
be considered; others held that facts in existence at the time of the original judgment but
not presented to the original court could be considered. Id. at 738.
171. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
172. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 102, at 213-14.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
174. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Bresset, 602 So. 2d 433, 434-35 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (Ala-
bama does not have authority to modify Florida custody determination unless Florida loses
jurisdiction or declines to exercise it); Adams v. Adams, 820 P.2d 752, 755 (Nev. 1991)
("[A] second state court cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction over... [a custody matter]
... if the first state retains and exercises jurisdiction."); Forsgren v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172,
1174-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (PKPA anchors exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify a
previous custody decree in the original home state). See also In re C.A.D., 839 P.2d 165,
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a new state does not extinguish the issuing state's custody
jurisdiction. 17
5
However, not all states agree that the issuing state has exclusive
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree. An Illinois court has held that
it can modify another state's custody judgment as long as one of the
PKPA's jurisdictional prerequisites is satisfied. 176 The West Virginia
Supreme Court has held that with the mobility of today's society,
states other than the original decree-issuing state must be vested with
jurisdiction to modify custody decrees. 177 This approach is at odds
with the legislative intent to restrict, not proliferate, modification
jurisdiction.
Many courts hold that without modification jurisdiction a state
may not make any change to the terms of another state's custody de-
cree.178 Nonetheless, some states have attempted to evade the
PKPA's restrictions by finding authority to make "minor" changes to
the custody order. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court has held
that it could validly change the visitation schedule of another state's
custody decree because such a schedule change was not a "modifica-
tion" of the decree.179
The PKPA provides that a court may modify the custody decree
of another state if the court of the issuing state no longer has jurisdic-
tion or has declined to exercise its jurisdiction.180 It is not clear what
constitutes absence of or relinquishment of jurisdiction. Occasionally,
a court may affirmatively decline jurisdiction. 181 However, in the ab-
188 (Okla. 1992) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (PKPA requires a state to refrain from exercising
concurrent jurisdiction over a custody dispute where another state has determined that it
has jurisdiction over the parties and is exercising that jurisdiction).
175. Smith v. Smith, 594 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
176. In re Marriage of Bueche, 550 N.E.2d 48, 51 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
177. In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515, 519 (W. Va. 1990) (citing UCCJA § 14 cmt., 9
U.L.A. at 292).
178. See, e.g., Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Cal. 1982) ("California is
not effectively enforcing... [an out-of-state]... decree if it modifies the decree as soon as
the child has spent six months within its borders."), quoted in In re Marriage of Ross, 471
N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1991). See also Bock v. Bock, 824 P.2d 723, 725 (Alaska 1992)
(modified lower court opinion, sua sponte, to remove any suggestion that Alaska's courts
were free to do anything but enforce another state's custody decree); In re McClurg, 605
N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he authority to enforce an out-of-state decree
does not include the power to modify it.").
179. In re Marriage of Ortiz, 801 P.2d 767, 770 (Or. 1990). This interpretation is clearly
incorrect because the PKPA defines custody determination as a "judgment, decree, or
other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(b)(3) (emphasis added).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f).
181. See, e.g., Gasser v. Sperry, 376 S.E.2d 478, 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
North Carolina's assumption of jurisdiction was proper after Florida District Court of Ap-
peal held that Florida lost jurisdiction to modify child custody order once children had left
Florida); Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D. 1991) (stating that North Dakota may
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sence of such an affirmative relinquishment by the decree-issuing
state, the court in the second state may have a more difficult time
determining whether jurisdiction has been declined.
Some courts have held that continuing jurisdiction may remain
with the issuing state even though there is no proceeding pending in
the issuing state.182 These courts may require that a petition for modi-
fication be filed first in the issuing state.
183
Other courts have held that a state may validly modify an out-of-
state decree as long as there is no proceeding pending in the issuing
state. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court has held that
ideally the decree-issuing state would be the appropriate state to ad-
dress modification of its decree, but West Virginia might also exercise
jurisdiction if a child were living in the state.'8 4 Occasionally, a court
will decide that the decree-issuing state would have relinquished juris-
diction if the action were brought there. 85
Jurisdictional uncertainty may be intensified if both parents have
left the original decree-issuing state and the interests of the two new
states where the parents live appear to be approximately equal. When
faced with this situation, the South Carolina Supreme Court asserted
jurisdiction using the "best interests of the child" standard. 86 How-
ever, a better way to resolve this problem, and the one most in keep-
ing with the spirit of the UCCJA and the PKPA, is for judges to
not exercise jurisdiction because neither children nor parents currently reside in the state);
Farley v. Farley, 387 S.E.2d 794,797 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming trial court's decision to
transfer jurisdiction to South Carolina). Sometimes a dispute may arise over whether a
particular court order transferring jurisdiction is actually a "relinquishment" of jurisdic-
tion. See In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. 1992) (Texas appellate court thought Min-
nesota appellate court order was not a relinquishment of jurisdiction, while the Texas
Supreme Court believed that it was).
182. "The inevitable implication from the statute ... is that exclusive modification
jurisdiction rests in the rendering state, whether or not that jurisdiction has been presently
invoked." McArthur v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 299 (Ct. App. 1991).
183. Barndt v. Barndt, 580 A.2d 320, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
184. In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515,520 (W. Va. 1990). See also Cullen v. Prescott,
394 S.E.2d 723, 725-26 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (court assumed jurisdiction to modify because
South Carolina had "significant contacts" with child, and no other state had exercised
jurisdiction).
185. The Alaska Supreme Court held that a Washington court would have concluded it
lacked jurisdiction to modify its original decree because the children now resided in
Alaska. Wanamaker v. Scott, 788 P.2d 712, 714 (Alaska 1990). This seems a dubious con-
clusion, in light of the Washington Supreme Court's aggressive attitude towards retaining
jurisdiction demonstrated in State v. Carver. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying
text.
186. Cullen v. Prescott, 394 S.E.2d 723, 725 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (following couples'
divorce in Georgia, mother moved to South Carolina, father to North Carolina).
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determine together which state has the most current contacts with the
child.187
B. Rationale for Continuing Jurisdiction in the Decree-Issuing State
The primacy of the issuing state in controlling modification juris-
diction probably came about, at least in part, because of constitutional
concerns. The PKPA does not confer jurisdiction on any state to han-
dle a particular child custody issue. It merely provides that decrees
issued by states satisfying certain jurisdictional prerequisites are enti-
tled to full faith and credit enforcement in other states. Congress
lacks the authority, on its own, to force a state to relinquish jurisdic-
tion, although the adoption of the UCCJA by all fifty states may pro-
vide this authority. 88
The drafters of the UCCJA were motivated, quite correctly, by
the belief that unnecessary relitigation of custody was itself harmful to
children. As early as 1948, Justice Roger Traynor of the California
Supreme Court spoke of the need to "avoid interminable and vexa-
tious litigation" in child custody disputes.18 9 Justice Traynor's remarks
were later quoted with approval by one of the drafters of the
UCCJA.190
Innovative work at Yale University in the late 1970s and early
1980s reviewed social science findings with respect to child develop-
ment.' 9' In reviewing this literature, Professor Joan Wexler concluded
that many of the routine assumptions of the legal system with respect
to child custody were not supported by the social science data. 192 She
wrote:
[A]Ithough courts have considered both the remarriage of the non-
custodial parent and the custodial parent's sexual activity as factors
supporting the application to modify custody, it appears that neither
factor supports such a change. When more meaningful variables are
considered-such as interparental conflict, residential changes, and
the young child's attachment needs-it becomes clear that custody
modification is justified only in special cases.193
187. See supra notes 27, 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing judicial communica-
tion encouraged by these statutes).
188. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional authority for the PKPA, see
supra note 43.
189. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (Cal. 1948).
190. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1214.
191. The seminal work in this area is JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
192. Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE
L.J. 758, 760 (1985). For a summary of the literature available at that time, see id. at 757
n.2.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
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Other legal scholars have espoused the view that stability is more
important in successfully raising children than the "right" custody
choice. Dr. Andrew Watson, psychiatrist and professor of law, ob-
served that "a child can handle almost anything better than he can
handle instability,"' 94 and that "poor parental models are easier to
adapt to than ever shifting ones."'195 Professor Homer Clark, author of
several fundamental textbooks in family law, wrote: "If [a child] is
continuously being transferred from one parent to the other by con-
flicting court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with
one parent, even though as an original proposition some better provi-
sion could have been made for him."'1 96 Professor Bodenheimer iden-
tifled one of the key objectives of the UCCJA's restriction of custody
modification as "preventing the harm done to children by shifting
them from state to state to relitigate custody."' 97
The UCCJA's drafters were correct in believing that restricting
modification jurisdiction to a single court would make it more difficult
to relitigate custody. Why, then, did they choose to anchor modifica-
tion jurisdiction in the issuing state? On the face of it, it is difficult to
understand the UCCJA's apparent indifference to the plight of the
custodial parent who moves out of state. The custodial parent, partic-
ularly a non-working mother with small children, may be at a serious
disadvantage if she is forced to return to the issuing state to modify
custody. She may face difficulties, for example, in obtaining extended
overnight care for the children while she is away. However, the alter-
native of taking the children to the other state may be economically
prohibitive.
There is evidence that the UCCJA's drafters were making a con-
scious choice in favor of certainty and were willing to tolerate some
unfairness to achieve this result. Professor Bodenheimer wrote that
"it matters less which court takes jurisdiction, but that the courts of
the several states concerned join in the effort and act in partnership to
bring about the best possible result for the child's future."'198 Profes-
sor Ratner, whose early proposals were influential to the UCCJA's
drafters, 199 acknowledged some unfairness in fixing the decree-issuing
state as the exclusive state for modification, but believed that choosing
194. Proceedings of Special Comm. on Unif Marriage & Divorce Act, Nat'l Conf. of
Commissioners on Unif. State Laws 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16, 1968), quoted in Bodenheimer,
UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1209.
195. 1L
196. CLARK, LAW oF DomEsmc RELATIONS, supra note 14, at 326.
197. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 102, at 214.
198. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1243.
199. Professor Ratner's contributions to the UCCJA are acknowledged in
Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1217.
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this state would provide an incentive for parents to keep communicat-
ing with each other.2 00
It is important to remember that in the 1960s, when most of the
drafting of the UCCJA was done, fault-based divorce was still the
norm.20 Much of the rationale underlying the UCCJA's selection of
the issuing state as the state that had exclusive jurisdiction to modify a
decree seems fault-based in tone. Professor Ratner noted that a par-
ent who moved out of state "impaired the visitation rights" of the par-
ent who remained in the original home state.202 Professor
Bodenheimer defended the exclusivity of the issuing state by observ-
ing that most child custody modification actions involved "unsuccess-
ful attempts to gain custody in a new state after kidnapping a child, or
retaining a child after a visit, in violation of an out-of-state custody
decree."2 03
The drafters of the UCCJA focused on "child-snatching" as a ma-
jor evil. Professor Ratner observed that a losing parent would be "en-
couraged to remove the child to another state in violation of the
original decree. '20 4 This concern was carried over to the PKPA, since
congressional hearings on the PKPA included much testimony from
the UCCJA's drafters.20 5 In fact, a major difference between the
PKPA and the UCCJA is that the PKPA provides federal help (by the
FBI and the Parent Locator Service) in locating parents who have ab-
ducted their children.20 6
There is no doubt that parental kidnapping is a serious problem.
A recent study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice estimated
that more than 354,000 children were abducted by a family member
during 1988, of which some 163,000, or 46%, were estimated to have
involved concealment, transportation out of state, or intent to perma-
nently alter custody.20 7 Professor Charlow believes this continued
high rate of parental abduction is an indication that the PKPA has
been ineffective. She writes that "the current law not only fails to
prevent parents from abducting children for forum shopping purposes,
... it may encourage them to do so" by inconsistent enforcement.20 8
200. Ratner, supra note 19, at 821.
201. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN F. APPLETON, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS (forthcoming 1994).
202. Ratner, supra note 19, at 821.
203. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 102, at 215.
204. Ratner, supra note 19, at 813.
205. Blakesley, supra note 48. See also Coombs, Snatched Child, supra note 97 (dis-
cussing the Wallop Proposal, which ultimately led to the PKPA).
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 654(17), 663 (1988).
207. DAVID FINKELOR ET AL., MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY AND THROWAWAY
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 4-6 (U.S. Dep't of Justice ed., 1990).
208. Andrea S. Charlow, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 25 FAM. L.Q. 299, 324 (1991).
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Professor Charlow is correct that inconsistent enforcement dimin-
ishes the effectiveness of the PKPA. However, it is incorrect to as-
sume that better enforcement of the PKPA will necessarily result in a
decline in parental kidnapping. By definition, the PKPA can only
reach those parents who bring their custody cases to court. Occasion-
ally parents who have abducted their children will attempt to legiti-
mize their situation by petitioning for custody modification, but these
parents are rarely treated sympathetically by the courts.20 9 In fact, the
jurisdictional restrictions of the PKPA virtually require a court to
make inquiries into a child's current living arrangements because the
"home state" basis for jurisdiction specifically excludes residence
based on "removal or retention" of a child by a parent.210 Far from
being encouraged to forum shop by the PKPA, the would-be abduct-
ing parent is much more likely to attempt to evade the legal system
and disappear entirely.21'
The focus on parental kidnapping may have blurred the drafters'
vision to the fact that many, perhaps most, relocations are for legiti-
mate reasons, such as remarriage, education or employment opportu-
nities, cost of living, return to a parent's home, or desire to start a new
life.21 2 The PKPA does not differentiate between "wrongful" and
"lawful" interstate moves. Nor does it address the issue of domestic
violence, which might justify such a move.213 These omissions may
well indicate a "blind spot" on the part of the drafters to the fre-
quency of legitimate removals.
The drafters may have also chosen the issuing state as the pre-
ferred state of modification jurisdiction for other reasons. The draft-
ers of the UCCJA may have been influenced by Professor
Ehrenzweig's utopian vision that the original court would act as a
"guardianship court," looking out for the child's interests until adult-
hood.214 Custody decisions remain the province of ordinary state
209. See, e.g, In re Custody of Bhatti, 391 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (court re-
fused to hear petition for modification by Mr. Bhatti because he had refused to inform his
wife of the children's whereabouts); Lutes v. Alexander 421 S.E. 2d 857 (Va. Ct. App.
1992) (court refused to recognize English custody decree when father had taken children
to England without informing wife of their whereabouts).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
211. See Daniel Oberdorfer, Larson v. Dunn: Toward a Reasoned Response to Parental
Kidnapping, 75 MitN. L. REv. 1701 (1991). In Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.
1990), a mother who had lost a custody battle hid her daughter from the child's father and
the law for seven years before she was ultimately discovered.
212. Joann S. Lublin, Cast Asunder: After Couples Divorce, Long-Distance Moves are
Often Wrenching, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at Al, A8.
213. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
214. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for
Extra-Litigious Proceedings, 64 MrcH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1965). The article was a reply to Pro-
fessor Ratner's original draft of the UCCJA, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child
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courts, however, and it is highly unlikely that a particular child cus-
tody modification decision will be decided by the same judge who ren-
dered the original custody order.
The drafters of the UCCJA may also have been influenced by the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA), first promulgated in 1950 to facilitate the enforcement of
out-of-state child support orders, and subsequently revised in 1968.215
Under RURESA, the parent seeking enforcement files suit in the ju-
risdiction where she resides (the "initiating court"). Proceedings fol-
low in the jurisdiction in which the parent owing support resides (the
"responding court"). The parent seeking support is represented by
the responding court's prosecuting attorney and does not need to ap-
pear in person herself. While the drafters of the UCCJA emphasized
the importance of the personal appearance of the children and both
parents,216 the UCCJA does provide procedures for remote represen-
tation.217 It appears the UCCJA's drafters foresaw no undue hardship
for the custodial parent who had moved out of state. Professor
Bodenheimer noted, "If travel to the adjudicating court is not practi-
cally feasible, out-of-state depositions or hearings before a court in
another state may be arranged by the court on its own motion. The
opportunity of a custody claimant to have his side of the argument
considered by the court is thus amply provided. '218
The drafters of the UCCJA seem to have implicitly assumed that
the selection of the court really did not make much difference-that
child custody courts in different parts of the country, presented with
the same set of facts, would reach essentially similar decisions.
Unfortunately, the choice of which court makes the substantive
custody decision does matter-to the litigants. Although substantive
custody law no longer varies among the states as much as it once
Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L.
REv. 183, 186-205 (1965). Professor Ehrenzweig's influence on the drafters of the UCCJA
is acknowledged in Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1217, and in the Prefatory Note
to the UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. at 117.
215. For information concerning the history and operation of RURESA, see Jane H.
Gorham, Stemming the Modification of Child-Support Orders by Responding Courts: A
Proposal to Amend RURESA's Antisupersession Clause, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 405 (1991).
216. See, e.g., UCCJA § 11 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 271 ("Since a custody proceeding is con-
cerned with the past and future care of the child by one of the parties, it is of vital impor-
tance in most cases that the judge has an opportunity to see and hear the contestants and
the child.").
217. See, e.g., UCCJA § 18 (permits a party, or the court on its own motion, to take
testimony in another state), UCCJA § 19 (permits the court to request hearings and studies
in another state), 9 U.L.A. at 318-19.
218. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1234-35.
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did,219 the "best interests of the child" standard used by virtually all of
the states allows for a significant amount of judicial discretion. A par-
ent who has lost a custody determination may feel that he or she has
lost only a battle, not the war. A losing parent may try "to get yet
another say in court, lured by the indeterminacy of substantive cus-
tody law's best interests ideal into believing that a different tribunal
will reach a more favorable result.
'220
Custody modification hearings are among the most acrimonious
of all divorce-related proceedings. Unlike child support hearings,
where the issues of financial need and ability to pay may be hotly
disputed but are easily framed, child custody hearings often involve
more complex issues. It is clear that a monthly support payment of
$400 would be more beneficial to a child than $50. It is more difficult
to determine which parent is better suited to make the many and va-
ried decisions associated with raising a child. Such decisions are
highly subjective, and judges often evaluate the demeanor and ap-
pearance of both parents in making determinations. A custodial par-
ent who is unable to personally appear at a modification hearing is
likely to be materially disadvantaged.
221
Although this statutory choice may have deterred some parents
from crossing state lines in order to relitigate custody, it has also pe-
nalized parents who have moved for more legitimate reasons. Now
the noncustodial parents who remain in the decree-issuing state may
reopen custody litigation. This may be a significant weapon for the
noncustodial parent, particularly if the litigation forces a custodial
parent to return from a distant state. Even the threat of such a suit
may be enough to extract significant concessions from the custodial
parent.
Judges have traditionally been given great discretion in making
substantive custody decisions. As a result, the outcome of any request
for modification is apt to be uncertain. As Professor Mnookin percep-
tively pointed out:
The fact that uncertainty about the outcome in court concerning
custody disadvantages the relatively more risk-averse parent is a pe-
culiarly ironic and tragic result. Most of us would assume that a
good parent would be unwilling to take a gamble in which one out-
219. "We have by now evolved what is in effect a uniform substantive child custody
law: the courts must try to achieve the best interests of the child." Goldstein, supra note
32, at 856-57.
220. Id. at 857.
221. Remote representation may not be all that effective even in child support actions.
A recent report from the General Accounting Office reported that of the 2.5 million
mothers who live in different states from the noncustodial fathers of their children, only
43% received child support payments regularly in 1989. Paul Taylor, Child-Support Bill
Seeks to Curb Evasion Tactic, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1992, at A7.
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come would substantially diminish his or her relationship with the
child. And yet the consequence of a vague, discretionary rule is to
disadvantage such a parent if he or she is negotiating with a spouse
who is more of a gambler.22
2
The tendency of some courts to evade the PKPA's requirements
in certain circumstances has resulted in continued uncertainty about
how courts will rule on a jurisdictional issue.2 2 3 Perhaps one reason so
many courts continue to evade the modification jurisdiction require-
ments of the PKPA is because the result it mandates seems unpalat-
able. States are reluctant to deny a forum to their residents, especially
if the resident is the parent of small children who cannot easily travel
to a distant state. It seems patently unfair to force the custodial par-
ent, especially one who has moved to a new state with the other par-




Since a stated intention of both the UCCJA and the PKPA is to
reduce litigation and deter abduction, uniform guidelines are neces-
sary for the statutes to be effective. Prior to 1988, it was unclear
whether litigants could resort to federal courts to resolve differing
state interpretations of the PKPA. A number of commentators sug-
gested that federal jurisdiction was the most efficient way to achieve
uniform interpretation of the PKPA.22 4 Federal jurisdiction was also
suggested as a way to resolve jurisdictional deadlocks, particularly in
circumstances in which one of the two disputing courts seemed to be
acting in a manner inconsistent with the aims of the PKPA.2 25 Several
federal circuit courts accepted jurisdiction to resolve such conflicts,
222. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE. L.J. 950, 979 (1979).
223. In State v. Carver, for example, Mr. Carver's California attorney had advised him
that under the PKPA his California decree was valid and would be enforceable in Washing-
ton. The Washington Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion. 781 P.2d 1308
(Wash. 1989) (en banc). See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Patricia M. Hoff, Federal Court Remedies in Interstate Child Custody and
Parental Kidnapping Cases, 19 FAM. L.Q. 443 (1986) (describing the increased involvement
of federal courts in custody disputes); Wilson, supra note 6 (recommending that Congress
amend the PKPA to allow federal court enforcement).
225. "Florida has been widely known as a state that shows disdain for the custody
decisions of sister states, to the point that a Florida litigant can successfully obtain a trial de
novo on custody issues despite the existence of out-of-state decrees." Elizabeth S. Baker,
Does Florida Create Intractable Jurisdictional Deadlocks?, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1988, at 43. For
evidence that Ms. Baker's observation about Florida courts may well be correct, see Lee v.
Meeks, 592 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("While the trial court may properly
consider the foreign [state custody] decree as a factor in deciding the custody issue, the trial
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either by finding an implied private cause of action in the statute,22 6 or
by deciding to grant declaratory relief regardless of whether an im-
plied private right of action existed227 Other circuit courts refused
jurisdiction.228
The United States Supreme Court resolved the dispute between
the circuits in Thompson v. Thompson.22 9 Mr. and Mrs. Thompson
divorced in California.230 The California court awarded Mrs. Thomp-
son sole custody of the couple's son, Matthew, pending a report by a
court-appointed investigator. 31 Mrs. Thompson moved to Louisiana
shortly after the divorce to take a new job.232 Three months after the
move, Mrs. Thompson filed a petition in Louisiana for the California
decree. Louisiana granted the petition and awarded sole custody of
Matthew to Mrs. Thompson.233 Subsequently, the California court,
having received and reviewed its investigator's report, awarded sole
custody to Mr. Thompson.234 Instead of attempting to enforce the
California decree in Louisiana, Mr. Thompson went directly to federal
court to resolve the conflict.235
Although it is difficult to determine what the Louisiana state
court might have done with such a petition, under a consistent reading
of the PKPA, a Louisiana court should have ruled that only the Cali-
fornia decree was valid. Louisiana did not have valid jurisdiction to
modify the California decree because California had not relinquished
jurisdiction and Louisiana did not qualify as Matthew's home state (he
had only been a resident for three months).
The Supreme Court used the case as an opportunity to review the
context, language, and history of the PKPA. It concluded that no pri-
vate right of action existed under the statute.236 The Court noted that
"the unspoken presumption in [Mr. Thompson's] argument is that the
States are either unable or unwilling to enforce the provisions of the
Act. This is a presumption we are not prepared, and more impor-
court is not bound by the full faith and credit clause to automatically enforce the foreign
decree.") (emphasis added).
226. See Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473 (4th Cir. 1987); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749
F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1983).
227. McDougald v. Jensen, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 860 (1986).
228. Rogers v. Platt 814 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d
1547 (9th Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). For an excellent summary of the cases
before 1988, see Wilson, supra note 6.
229. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
230. Id. at 177.





236. Id. at 187.
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tantly, Congress was not prepared, to indulge." 237 Even if state courts
do prove as obstinate as Mr. Thompson predicted, the Court believed
it was for Congress, not the court, to provide a remedy by amending
the statute.238
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Thompson's argument that fed-
eral jurisdiction over PKPA disputes would require federal courts only
to analyze which of two states should be given exclusive jurisdiction
over custody disputes, not to consider the merits of the custody dis-
pute itself.239 On the contrary, the Court said jurisdiction under the
Act could turn on the child's "best interests" or on proof that the child
had been abandoned or abused.240 The Court asserted that "jurisdic-
tional disputes that are sufficiently complicated as to have provoked
conflicting state-court holdings are the most likely to require resolu-
tion of . . .traditional domestic relations inquiries.1241 The Court's
opinion here overstates the problem. Many of the disputes over the
PKPA's jurisdictional rules arise from confusion over the definition of
terms, such as "home state" or "proceeding," 242 and could be resolved
without reference to the merits of each parent's argument. The Court
may have believed that it would be burdensome for federal courts to
determine which PKPA disputes dealt with substantive issues and
which were merely jurisdictional, and that it would be far simpler for
federal courts to refuse jurisdiction over all PKPA disputes.
243
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson, par-
ents have no easy remedy for competing decrees.244 Although
Thompson foreclosed a private right of action under the PKPA, par-
ents have tried other means to gain federal court jurisdiction, with
varying degrees of success. The Supreme Court has held that there is
no federal jurisdiction for a writ of habeas corpus based on a parent's
challenge to a state's termination of his or her parental rights. 245 The
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 186 n.4.
240. Id. (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)-(D)). See supra note 68.
241. 484 U.S. at 186 n.4.
242. See, e.g., supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (definition of proceeding).
243. As part of its review of the legislative history, the Court referred to testimony by
the Justice Department that "federal enforcement of state custody decrees would increase
the workload of the federal courts ...." 484 U.S. at 185.
244. Steven M. Schuetze, Thompson v. Thompson: The Jurisdictional Dilemma of
Child Custody Cases Under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 409
(1989). Schuetze discusses the overall impact that the Supreme Court's opinion in Thomp-
son will have on the PKPA. Thompson was not retroactively applied. Maesch v. Maesch,
761 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
245. "State utilization of habeas to test the legal custody of a child is part of the fabric
of its reserved jurisdiction over child custody matters .... The federal government, how-
ever, has no parallel substantive interest in ... the constitutional issues collateral to such
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Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has accepted jurisdiction over a par-
ent's complaint that a state court's deprivation of custody violated her
civil rights.2
46
A possible source of federal jurisdiction is the enforcement of the
UCCJA as an interstate compact. The UCCJA has been adopted,
with only minor deviations, by all fifty states. It could be argued that
states that consistently ignored the UCCJA's jurisdictional prefer-
ences or refused to communicate with the courts of other states to
resolve interstate custody disputes were effectively denying the en-
forcement of a validly adopted interstate compact.247 Although the
UCCJA is not a reciprocal law, it was recognized by the drafters, and
implicitly by the states that adopted it, that its full benefits would not
be reaped until a large number of states adopted it.248 The concept
that federal jurisdiction may properly be sought to enforce a valid in-
terstate compact has been accepted by the Ninth Circuit,249 while a
federal district court in Texas has accepted federal jurisdiction for en-
forcement of URESA.2 0 However, federal jurisdiction for the en-
forcement of the UCCJA remains untried.
Implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson was the
"domestic relations exception," a doctrine under which federal courts
have traditionally declined diversity jurisdiction over actions related
to divorce and child custody.251 The contours of the exception had
never been precisely developed, and the Supreme Court was silent on
the subject for more than sixty years.252 The Court revisited the issue
in a 1992 decision, holding that a federal district court had erred in
failing to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a child abuse claim.253
disputes." Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 515
(1982).
246. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff brought suit against her
former husband alleging a conspiracy to deprive her of custody without due process of law.
247. See supra note 225 (discussing the possibility that Florida might be such a state).
248. UCCJA prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 118.
249. Price v. Hawaii, 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985). The court held that it had jurisdic-
tion over an interstate compact that required transferred federal land to be devoted to the
betterment of Hawaiians. Il at 629.
250. Sheres v. Engelman, 534 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
251. The history and origin of the "domestic relations exception" are beyond the scope
of this Note. Several excellent articles have been written on the subject, including Barbara
Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of
Jurisdiction, 35 HASTNOs LJ. 571 (1984); Bonnie Moore, Federal Jurisdiction and the Do-
mestic Relations Exception: A Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REv. 843 (1984); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Per-
spective, 60 NoT-E DAME L. Rlv. 1 (1984); Anthony B. Ullman, The Domestic Relations
Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1824 (1983).
252. Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) (involving a Roumanian vice-
counsel sued by his wife in an Ohio state court for divorce and alimony).
253. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
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According to the Court, the Constitution did not mandate the exclu-
sion of domestic relations cases from federal court jurisdiction. 254 The
Court approved the longstanding federal practice of declining jurisdic-
tion over most domestic relations matters, but concluded that "the do-
mestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the
issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree."- 5 Since the
case before the court did not involve the issuance of a custody decree,
but instead involved alleged torts (sexual abuse) committed by the
child's father and his female companion, the Court said federal courts
not only could, but should, exercise jurisdiction.
256
Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, divided domestic rela-
tions actions into four categories:
The first, or "core," category involves declarations of status, e.g.,
marriage, annulment, divorce, custody and paternity. The second,
or "semi-core," category involves declarations of rights or obliga-
tions arising from status (or former status), e.g., alimony, child sup-
port, and division of property. The third category consists of
secondary suits to enforce declarations of status, rights, or obliga-
tions. The final catch-all category covers tort suits between family
or former family members for sexual abuse, battering, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.257
Justice Blackmun concluded that the case before the Court fell into
the fourth category so a federal court was not precluded from exercis-
ing jurisdiction.
25s
The Court's confident differentiation between child custody suits
and child abuse suits is misguided. Child abuse claims are frequently
made in cases of disputed custody.259 While many of these claims are
legitimate, at least some of the abuse claims made against former
spouses may be an attempt to relitigate an otherwise final custody de-
cree. State courts that regularly deal with disputed custody cases are
better equipped to discern attempts to manipulate the process. Child
abuse prosecutions also pose special problems in dealing with child
witnesses. However, most state courts have already considered and
developed procedures for child witnesses in connection with disputed
custody suits. 260 Ironically, the child abuse case that the Court
254. Id. at 2212.
255. Id. at 2215 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 2216.
257. Id. at 2221-22 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 2222.
259. A 1991 poll of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers found that more
than three-fourths of attorneys responding had seen increases in allegations of sexual
abuse in their practices. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Sex Abuse Charges Rise in Divorce Fights,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1992, at D4.
260. For a good discussion of some of these issues, see Jean Montoya, On Truth and
Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 (1992).
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deemed appropriate for federal jurisdiction may be less suited for fed-
eral courts than jurisdictional disputes resulting from conflicting inter-
pretations of the PKPA, to which the Court has denied federal judicial
help.
Although the Court expressed a preference for a narrow interpre-
tation of the domestic relations exception, it still did not precisely de-
fine the exception. Some of the language of the opinion, in particular
Justice Blackmun's third category of domestic relations cases (suits to
enforce declarations of status, rights, or obligations),261 implies that
federal diversity jurisdiction might exist for enforcement of out-of-
state custody decrees. This argument has been rejected by the First
Circuit, which noted that "plaintiff's real aim ... was to obtain direct
enforcement of one of two conflicting state custody decrees," not to
resolve an issue "that might interfere with effectuation of a state court
decree. '262 The First Circuit's opinion may indicate that federal
courts remain reluctant to entertain PKPA disputes.
Federal judicial review of interpretations by state courts of the
PKPA's jurisdictional rules would seem to be the most efficient way to
achieve uniformity.263 Federal review would certainly help when two
judges fail to agree or when two state courts issue opposing decrees.
There are a number of reasons, however, why federal jurisdiction
would not provide an effective solution. Overburdened federal courts
may not be eager to take these cases. There is some truth to the
Supreme Court's observation in Thompson that federal courts may
not be able to separate substantive issues easily from purely jurisdic-
tional ones. 264 Even if the Supreme Court were to accept these cases
with greater frequency, the time period required to appeal from the
original state court and the costs involved would put this remedy out
of the reach of most parents.265 "[T]he question may even become
moot because, by the time the case reached the Court, the child might
no longer be a minor. '266
Jurisdiction over child custody is a complex area, and the ap-
proach of many state courts to jurisdictional issues has changed dra-
matically in recent years.267 Federal courts that only rarely consider
261. 112 S. Ct. at 2221.
262. Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, No. 92-1624, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS 32222 at *6-*7 (1st
Cir. Dec. 9, 1992).
263. "It would take very few Supreme Court decisions to determine which of several
conflicting interpretations of specific portions of [the PKPA] are controlling .... Char-
low, supra note 208, at 312.
264. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
265. Charlow, supra note 208, at 312.
266. Id.
267. For example, see discussion of approaches to domestic violence and its effect on
interstate moves, supra note 106.
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custody issues may make decisions that are inconsistent with the
trends of most state courts.
268
B. Statutory Amendment
If the continuing lack of uniformity is due to incorrect statutory
interpretation, it should be possible to amend the PKPA to remedy
the statutory weaknesses. Statutory amendments could:
a) expressly provide for federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause;2
69
b) clarify that the "home state" definition applies to joint custody
situations, so that courts would not have to resort to a "significant
connections" tie breaker;270
c) provide a definition of the term "proceeding" that clearly dif-
ferentiates the original custody decision from modification
hearings;271
d) provide a definition of "removal or retention" to allow courts
to clearly distinguish between lawful removals and abductions;272
e) clarify the extent of a court's authority under emergency
jurisdiction;273
f) expressly provide for establishment of jurisdiction by consent
of the parties;
274
g) clarify that the due process requirements of the PKPA are sat-
isfied by notice reasonably calculated to reach the opposing party;
275
and
h) provide procedures for a state to clearly relinquish jurisdiction
in order to allow another state to modify the decree.
276
Statutory amendment is only a partial solution, however. As Pro-
fessor Blakesley has perceptively pointed out, "Courts will invariably
interpret the same legislation in differing ways, depending on the pol-
icy seen as paramount.
'277
Professor Goldstein believes that any federal system that com-
mits custody decisions to sovereign states, permits parents and chil-
dren to move freely among the states, and decides and modifies orders
268. See discussion of Burnham v. Superior Court, supra notes 143-146 and accompa-
nying text.
269. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text (federal preemption).
270. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (joint custody).
271. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (proceeding).
272. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying test (removal or retention).
273. See supra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (emergency jurisdiction).
274. See supra notes 122-138 and accompanying text (jurisdiction by consent).
275. See supra notes 151-156 and accompanying text (due process).
276. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text (relinquishment of jurisdiction).
277. Blakesley, supra note 48, at 374.
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according to indeterminate and subjective standards will result in in-
terstate jurisdictional conflicts.278 She has suggested that repealing
the PKPA would perhaps be more honest by allowing the courts to act
in the best interests of the children without wasting time interpreting
the complicated jurisdictional rules.279
To repeal the PKPA would be wrong. Although there are still
interstate custody battles, and not all courts interpret the statute con-
sistently, the PKPA has been at least a qualified success.280 Congres-
sional consensus on the PKPA was not easily won and should not be
lightly discarded.281
Implicit in Professor Goldstein's suggestion is the belief that
judges first arrive at an answer to a jurisdictional dispute and then
search for a statutory justification.282 However, many judicial deci-
sions indicate conscientious review of scholarly literature and case
law.283 The primary judicial inconsistencies in initial custody decisions
involve terms not well defined by the statute, such as "proceeding," or
issues that had not achieved public awareness at the time the statutes
were written, such as problems related to joint custody and domestic
violence. Significant evasion of the PKPA's rules for modification of
custody decrees remains a problem, but may result from an unwise
statutory prescription, rather than from territoriality on the part of
state court judges.
C. Child-Based Jurisdiction for Custody Modifications
The modification of prior custody decrees remains one of the
most difficult interstate custody issues for courts to resolve. Prior to
the adoption of the UCCJA, jurisdiction for the modification of cus-
tody decrees was child-based. A parent who appeared with a child in
a new forum was often able to reopen custody litigation.284 The
UCCJA, and later the PKPA, attempted to solve the problem of easily
modifiable custody decisions by fixing exclusive continuing jurisdic-
tion to modify an existing decree on the original decree-issuing state.
Child-based jurisdiction was explicitly rejected by the UCCJA, which
does not require the appearance of either the child or the custodial
278. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 946.
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text (PKPA in successful action).
281. The first version of the statute failed to win approval. Abram, supra note 43, at
94-95.
282. For example, she writes, "Although courts sometimes defer to other states' pend-
ing proceedings, when they consider it appropriate they have easily been able to find statu-
tory grounds for asserting jurisdiction .... ." Goldstein, supra note 32, at 888.
283. See, e.g., Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 45 (Wyo. 1992) (citing various law
review articles).
284. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
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parent in the court rendering a custody decision.285 The PKPA is si-
lent on the necessity of the appearance of the child in the forum mak-
ing a custody decision, although it contains an explicit provision fixing
modification jurisdiction in the decree-issuing state.
286
The issuing state has limited justification for continuing jurisdic-
tion once children have moved out of state. The drafters of the
UCCJA were correct in believing that the "established home" of the
child, a place where a child had lived with a parent for a sufficient
time to become integrated into the community, was generally the most
appropriate place to make an initial custody determination.287 The
same is true for the modification of custody decisions. The fact that
one parent remains in the decree-issuing state is insufficient to over-
ride the fact that the best information available concerning the child is
generally available in the state in which she currently lives.
Child-based jurisdiction has been implicitly recognized by many
courts, which voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction if the child has moved
out of the state. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has ob-
served that "[b]y enacting the UCCJA, Georgia expressed a clear in-
tent that litigation concerning a child's custody be conducted in the
forum with which the child is most closely associated"-the home
state. 288 Texas statutory law requires that once a child establishes a
new home state, the continuing jurisdiction of Texas courts over a
prior custody determination ceases.289
Some commentators have argued for the imposition of explicitly
child-based jurisdiction on the states by a federal statute.290 Constitu-
tional authority for a congressional rule that effectively requires a
state to relinquish jurisdiction is lacking, particularly if such a statute
would be in opposition to the UCCJA. However, the voluntary adop-
tion of such a rule by the individual states would go a long way toward
reducing the conflict and uncertainty that still plague child custody
litigation. Parental attempts to relitigate custody are driven by power-
285. UCCJA § 11, 9 U.L.A. at 271.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f).
287. Bodenheimer, UCCJA, supra note 2, at 1224-25.
288. Kemp v. Sharp, 409 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. 1991). See also Fitch v. Burns, 782
S.W.2d 618, 624 (Ky. 1989) (Vance, J., dissenting) (stating that jurisdiction for child custody
should lie in the place where the children permanently reside); Stowers v. Humphrey, 576
So. 2d 138, 141 (Miss. 1991) (finding fact that children have new home state strong ground
for discretionary decline of jurisdiction by decree state); Farley v. Farley, 387 S.E.2d 794,
796-97 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (finding children's home state more convenient forum for modi-
fication determination because it had the "intimate familiarity and interaction necessary in
cases of this type").
289. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 11.05(g) (Vernon 1986), cited in Reppond v. Blake, 822
S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
290. Leona Mary Hudak, Seize, Run and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Cus-
tody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 547-48 (1974).
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ful emotions and are not likely to decrease appreciably unless parents'
attorneys can conclusively advise their clients that relitigation is likely
to be futile.291
There is much to support the concept of basing jurisdiction for
child custody modifications in the current home state of the child. The
home state is likely to be the one with the best access to current infor-
mation and witnesses regarding the child's welfare. Correctly inter-
preted, the statutory prohibitions, in both the UCCJA and the PKPA,
against changing a child's home state through "removal or retention"
provide adequate safeguards against illegal abductions.
Although requiring the modification to be litigated in the state of
the custodial parent may prove burdensome to the noncustodial par-
ent, one party is always inconvenienced in an interstate custody dis-
pute. Professor Atwood has persuasively argued that the "tripolar"
nature of the custody lawsuit (mother-father-child) distinguishes it
from an ordinary bipolar lawsuit. The burdens on the noncustodial
parent should not be allowed to obscure the contacts of the child in
assessing the fairness of jurisdiction.292 Because the child's interest
depends so heavily on the availability of a forum with access to rele-
vant evidence, and because both parents share an interest in the effec-
tive resolution of the custody dispute, mere inconvenience to the
noncustodial parent seems outweighed by other concerns.293
An approach limiting jurisdiction to the current home state of the
child will not work, however, unless judges themselves exercise re-
straint over the modification of child custody disputes. There are two
requirements, after all, for a successful attempt to modify a child cus-
tody decree via abduction-a parent willing to move to another state
and a court willing to reopen the case. Prior to the adoption of the
UCCJA, parents were frequently able to reopen a custody decision
simply by moving to another state. It was this free-wheeling judicial
discretion in reopening custody cases that the UCCJA and the PKPA
were designed to address.
Ample evidence indicates that after more than twenty years of
experience with child custody jurisdiction statutes and a substantial
body of literature about children's paramount need for stability,
courts are ready to exercise the necessary self-restraint.294 Many
courts have expressly held that the standard for modification should
291. Blakesley, supra note 48, at 366.
292. Atwood, supra note 43, at 376.
293. Id.
294. "Provincialism does not reign and, to the contrary, state courts have frequently
declined jurisdiction as a matter of discretion .... " Michael Finch & Jerome Kasriel,
Federal Court Correction of State Court Error: The Singular Case of Interstate Custody
Disputes, 48 OHIo ST. L.I. 927, 997 (1987).
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be high.295 Courts have refused to exercise emergency jurisdiction
when the underlying allegations had already been addressed by an-
other court.296 Courts will make inquiries about pending custody ac-
tions in other states and will frequently confer with courts in those
states.297 Consistent with the federal statute, courts have been unsym-
pathetic to parents who have taken their children to another state and
attempted to conceal their whereabouts. 2 98
Most importantly, courts have shown an understanding that, by
opening their doors too easily to those who wish to relitigate an unfa-
vorable decision, they are not acting in the best interests of the chil-
dren.299 State appellate courts have frequently been willing to
overturn decisions made by the lower courts of their own state when
they felt the assertion of jurisdiction contravened the PKPA. 300
Courts no longer seem to view themselves as the only forum that can
act in a child's best interest.
Child custody jurisdictional decisions must balance a need for
flexibility with a desire for certainty and finality. Courts must have
the flexibility to reopen consideration of a custody decision when cir-
cumstances have significantly changed. The barriers to reopening a
custody decision must be high enough to deter parents from attempt-
ing to relitigate decisions that are not perfectly satisfactory, but not so
high that the only recourse might appear to be self-help or going un-
derground. Jurisdictional rules must be uniform enough to deter mov-
ing to another state in an attempt to get a different result, but not so
rigid that a parent who remains in the state of the original custody
decree gains an unfair negotiating advantage.
Explicitly basing jurisdiction for the modification of child custody
decisions in the home state of the child strikes the proper balance
among these competing concerns. Properly applied, the "home state
295. "[I]f there has been a legal determination [in one state] that one parent has cus-
tody, when the other parent seeks to circumvent that legal determination by a court of
another state, it cannot be done." Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24, 29 (Miss. 1990) (citing
Owens ex rel. Mosley v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231, 243 (Miss. 1985)).
296. "[T]he extent of [the mother's] grievance is not the issue .... The issue is whether
there is an emergency involving the children which cannot be addressed effectively in the
forum state .. " Benda v. Benda, 565 A.2d 1121, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(emphasis added). See also Archambault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990)
(court declined jurisdiction based on child abuse when New Hampshire had already validly
asserted jurisdiction).
297. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (judicial conference).
298. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (removal or retention).
299. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in overturning an assertion of jurisdiction by
its own lower court, noted that the family court, in exercising jurisdiction, "created a situa-
tion that opened the door for jurisdictional conflict while prolonging resolution of a case
that had been settled [long ago]." Jordan v. Jordan, 586 A.2d 1080, 1084 (R.I. 1991).
300. See supra note 180 (relinquishment of jurisdiction).
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of the child" concept embodied in the PKPA provides sufficient safe-
guards against the establishment of jurisdiction through parental ab-
duction. Courts have been sufficiently educated about the value of
stability in child custody decisions to exercise the degree of self-re-
straint necessary for effective enforcement. The "home state of the
child" is sufficiently certain that in most cases parents will not have to
guess what a particular court's jurisdictional determination will be.
Most importantly, the explicit preference for home state jurisdiction
would shift the statutory emphasis from the rights of the parents to the
rights of the child. The child, after all, is the subject of the custody
dispute and must bear the result of a court's decision. It is the child's
right to have custody litigated in his or her own home state-the fo-
rum with the best access to current information and the one most
likely to reach the best result for him or her.

